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Foreword 
Anna-Sofia has recently turned fifty. This is occasion for celebration 
and compilation of a Festschrift!  
Before becoming a professor in Gothenburg, Anna-Sofia was a 
member of the philosophy department here in Lund, and a well-
respected one at that. We have to confess that as PhD-students we 
were a bit afraid of Anna-Sofia because she was our senior and gave 
a somewhat critical, fiery and flamboyant impression. But, as anyone 
who has had the pleasure to know Anna-Sofia can attest, the above 
is not a list of her shortcomings but of her strengths as a philosopher, 
colleague and friend. Not only did she force us to sharpen our argu-
ments and look at the problems from different angles, but her out-
spokenness, which was (and still is) equally directed across the aca-
demic hierarchy, convinced us of her integrity, honesty and loyalty. 
And as is typical of persons with these qualities: once exposed to, 
they are the most addictive and rewarding.  
The topic of this Festschrift is metaphysics. Its title is Maurinian 
Truths. Maurinian truths, as we understand them, are about the un-
derlying reality undergirding, grounding or making true the more 
familiar Moorean truths (cf. Maurin 2002; Moore 1925/1959). 
Given that we metaphysicians are highly fallible, a more accurate 
title would perhaps have been Maurinian Truths - and Possibly some 
Maurinian Falsehoods. Or simply, Maurinian Falsehoods. But we 
wanted the title to reflect our, qua metaphysicians, optimistic (but 
undoubtedly overconfident) state of mind. Of course, yet another 
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possibility would have been to choose the conditional title If Mau-
rinian Truths; but as of now we haven’t fully worked out the conse-
quences of the papers (if true). (And, taken as a compound unit, they 
clearly entail too many consequences; some of the papers, interest-
ingly enough, flatly contradict each other.)   
All in all, the Festschrift consists of eighteen papers written by Swe-
dish and international Anna-Sofia fans. The papers are all quite 
short. We have tried to keep them around 2000 words (give or take 
a few hundred words, depending on the compliance of the author). 
We hope you, Anna-Sofia, will find them stimulating and enjoyable!   
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No Trope has Another Trope as Part 
Peter Simons 
1. Tropes as simple 
Anna-Sofia Maurin’s If Tropes (2002) is an impressive sustained de-
fence of trope ontology. As a co-adherent of this ontology, I make 
no issue with her arguments for tropes or her rebuttal of counterar-
guments, but am assuming that trope ontology is, even if not – as 
we both believe – correct, at least a strong contender for fundamen-
tal ontology. Instead I shall be examining a thesis that Maurin pro-
poses in her book in the expository second Chapter, Section 2.2 
(2002: 11–15). This is the proposition 
Tropes are simple. 
In the section in question, Maurin defends her thesis against argu-
ments by Chris Daly to the effect that a trope has to be complex, 
namely as a state of affairs of a substrate instantiating a universal. 
While having no complaints about her successful rebuttal of Daly, 
it seems to me that a more moderate position, that some tropes are 
complex, needs further consideration, and that is my topic here. Spe-
cifically, I shall be considering the question whether one trope can 
have another trope as a (proper) part. If it can, then by the Weak 
Supplementation Principle of mereology (Simons 1987: 28), such a 
trope has at least two disjoint parts, and is therefore complex. 
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2. Tropes are parts 
The standard tropist view of concrete particulars (hereafter: concreta) 
is that they consist at least mainly of tropes. The more parsimonious 
(and elegant) bundle theory holds that concreta consist ultimately of 
tropes and nothing else. The adverb ‘ultimately’ is necessary because 
most familiar concreta have other concreta as parts. The bundle the-
ory applies in the first instance to concreta with no other concreta as 
parts: atomic concreta. Candidate examples are fundamental parti-
cles such as electrons and quarks. Whether they really are good ex-
amples is not the point: what the tropist holds is that whatever the 
atomic concreta are, they are trope bundles. How the bundles are 
held together is a matter of debate, but is not here crucial. What 
bundle theorists all hold is that no further parts apart from tropes go 
to make up atomic concreta. A few tropists such as Martin (1980) 
hold that tropes alone do not a concretum make: a concretum re-
quires a substrate as a further constituent to hold it together. Such a 
substrate theorist does not deny that tropes are parts of concreta, 
only that they are not the only parts. 
3. Tropes can be extended 
Tropes are employed in ontology to explain the qualitative and 
quantitative natures of things. For example, a fundamental particle 
typically has a mass, electric charge, spin, magnetic moment, and a 
few other properties. Each of these, for the tropist, is a trope. Ac-
cording to physics, fundamental particles are not point-sized, but 
extend over a small region. It is therefore reasonable to assume that 
the same goes for their tropes. If particles are not basic, but either 
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fields or processes are more basic, then these are more obviously ex-
tended; in the case of processes, in time as well as space. Only if there 
are point-sized atomic concreta would their tropes also be unex-
tended. But it is extremely doubtful that there are such concreta.  
Being extended over a region which has other regions as parts does 
not imply that a trope extended over this region has parts corre-
sponding to the parts of the region. Simple tropes may extend over 
the region as a whole, and they are then candidates for being extended 
simples (Simons 2004). 
A more familiar example would be colour. Suppose an object’s 
surface is uniformly coloured: it might be a red tomato or sheet of 
white paper. If we accept that the whole surface has a single colour 
trope of the appropriate kind, then this trope would have a spatial 
extension with that area.  
4. Does an extended trope have other tropes as 
parts? 
Cut a uniformly red tomato in half. Ignoring the internal sections 
exposed by the cut, each of the halves has a uniform red surface 
which was previously part of the surface of the whole tomato. These 
two half-surfaces have their own colour-tropes if the whole tomato 
did. The two parts of the tomato’s surface were that colour before 
the cut, so it seems reasonable that their colour-tropes existed before 
the cut and did not come into being with the cut. If so, then it seems 
likewise reasonable to conclude that the tropes of the two parts of 
the tomato’s surface before the cut were parts of the trope of its 
whole surface, from which it follows that a trope can have another 
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trope as a proper part. If this is right, then some tropes are not sim-
ple, but have other tropes – here of the same kind – as parts. 
Suppose we wish to maintain the view that all tropes are simple 
in the face of this argument. What options are there?  
The first is the Aristotelian view that the two partial tropes only 
come into existence when the cut is made, and at that time the trope 
of the whole surface ceases to exist, so at no time is one trope part of 
another. The trope is a trope of the maximal surface of that colour, 
it is itself an extended simple, and its existence qua extended simple 
explains the uniformity of the surface colour. On this account, the 
parts of the surface do not have their own personal colour-tropes, 
but rather borrow their colour from the whole trope. This however 
goes against the tropist idea that when several particulars are exactly 
alike in some respect, it is because each particular has its own trope, 
where these tropes are simply exactly alike. Turning the point 
around, suppose we accept (I do not, but let it pass) that there is a 
single maximal object consisting of all the objects having that par-
ticular colour. Then only it would have a colour-trope and all the 
smaller ones would get their colour from it. But this is hardly differ-
ent from saying that the unique whole trope is a universal, going 
against the grain of trope nominalism. This first option is then, if 
not inconsistent, certainly uncongenial to a tropist. 
A second option is to deny that there are extended surface colour-
tropes at all, but that surface colour results from the aggregation of 
other qualities, not themselves perceptible, which are located among 
the small parts of the surface. Colour is then not a basic property, 
and uniform colour results from a (near-)uniform distribution of the 
micro-tropes resulting more macroscopically in colour. This has the 
advantage of being closer to the scientific account of what consti-
tutes surface colour, namely surface reflectance, which turns on the 
13 
natures of the molecules at or near a concretum’s surface, with what-
ever tropes of their own that this involves. The part–whole relations 
required here are not among tropes themselves, but among the 
smaller concreta which are parts of the larger body. 
Aggregation is in any case a feature that should command assent 
in other cases. Take the mass of a body, such as our tomato. It results 
from the aggregation of the masses of its basic parts, and is quanti-
tatively the sum of those masses minus the small amount of binding 
energy it takes to hold the body and its parts together. There is no 
need to postulate an additional total mass-trope of the body as a 
whole. Similar remarks apply to other summative characteristics 
such as area and volume – if their account requires tropes (I am not 
sure it does). 
5. Gestalt-tropes 
Some characteristics of concreta appear not to derive from aggrega-
tion of characteristics of their parts, but to characterise the whole 
directly, albeit requiring some partial foundation in the concretum’s 
parts. If there are tropes that account for such characteristics, it is 
appropriate to call them Gestalt-tropes, indeed as a tropist interpre-
tation of Ehrenfels’s original Gestaltqualitäten (1890). We consider 
two plausible examples: shape, and melody (the latter being Ehren-
fels’s own Machian example). Note that we are not here talking 
about our perception of shape or of melody, but of shape and melody 
themselves.  
Consider a spherical object, such as a snooker ball. While its mass 
and colour arise by aggregation, its spherical shape does not derive 
from the shapes of its parts, but characterises the ball as a whole. It 
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is spherical because of the relative spatial dispositions of its smaller 
parts, but for the parts to be so disposed is just what it is for the 
whole to be spherical. As and when an object’s parts are disposed in 
that way, it is spherical. But its being spherical is a resultant distinc-
tive feature characterising it as a whole, and there seems no reason 
not to count that feature as a trope, which is then a Gestalt-trope. 
A very simple case of a melody being played would be a non-pia-
nist (myself, for example) picking out a tune with one finger on a 
piano, Sir Hubert Parry’s Jerusalem, say. That same tune can be 
played many times, by many people, on different instruments and 
in different keys. What makes the various concrete events playings 
of the tune Jerusalem consists in the intervallic and durational inter-
relations of the successive tones produced. As in the case of spatial 
shape, the overall character of the melody accrues to it as a whole, 
and again there is no reason not to take this character as a distinctive 
Gestalt-trope. 
Nevertheless, the existence of such Gestalt-tropes in no way sup-
ports the idea that one trope can be part of another, precisely because 
the Gestalt-trope characterises the whole object and not its parts or 
its tropes.  
6. Fractal tropes? 
A more intriguing and potentially worrying possibility would be 
shapes or other Gestalten that are self-similar or fractal. If an object 
had a shape which is a fractal Gestalt-trope, then it would have parts 
which are exactly similar to that of the whole, so would have infi-
nitely many exactly similar Gestalt-tropes “inside” itself. But once 
again they would be (exactly similar) tropes of parts, not tropes that 
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are parts of other tropes. The case is similar to that of a spherical ball 
and one of its hemispheres: the spherical shape characterises the 
whole ball, the hemispherical shape characterises half of the ball, not 
the shape of the whole ball. The difference in the case of fractals is 
that some parts are exactly similar in shape to their wholes, and so 
on down ad infinitum. The possibility that one Gestalt-trope be part 
of another only appears plausible if we forget there is an object with 
the shape and imagine that all there is to the fractal object is the 
shape – which of course is how mathematicians describe things. 
There are no exact fractals in nature: despite the existence of ob-
jects which approximate fractals to a few degrees, such as snowflakes, 
proper fractals are infinitely complex, and therefore mathematical, 
not natural, so trope theory does not realistically apply. How math-
ematical abstracta and tropes might consort together is, for a nomi-
nalist, an uninteresting and merely hypothetical matter.  
7. Conclusion 
There may be other cases lending some plausibility to the idea that 
one trope can be a proper part of another. I have not been able to 
think of any – but that does not mean there are none. At any rate, 
for the cases that I have surveyed, there is no convincing argument 
for one trope’s being part of another. So we may continue to hold, 
as a reasonable hypothesis, that tropes are indeed simple. 
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Tropes are Gunky – On the 
Relations Between Trope Theory, 
Monism, and Particularism 
Fredrik Stjernberg 
There is an argument showing that trope theory, as developed and 
described in for instance Williams (1997) and Maurin (2002), is 
problematic, or at least that tropes turn out to be complicated in an 
unexpected manner (Stjernberg 2008). The argument shows that 
tropes cannot be atoms – hence (perhaps) not the “elements of be-
ing”, as D. C. Williams put it. This argument can be given a twist, 
to show that tropes are gunky, in the technical sense described in 
Schaffer (2010). This would provide a new argument for monism, at 
least for what Schaffer calls priority monism: “Priority monism … 
is the doctrine that exactly one concrete object token is basic, and is 
equivalent to the classical doctrine that the whole is prior to its 
(proper) parts” (Schaffer 2018, Introduction). 
First, the argument.1 Second, the connection with gunk, and fi-
nally a few thoughts about the situation. The end result is perhaps 
                                                     
1 What follows is in essence the argument in Stjernberg (2008). I have changed 
my mind a bit about how to react to the argument, however. 
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not as clear-cut as I have led the reader to think. More work would 
have to be done here. 
1. Tropes and atomicity 
How are we to explain that different objects can share one and the 
same property? This is a problem with a long history, going back to 
Plato. According to trope theory, a sentence like “John is happy” is 
not to be analysed as attributing a property to some object (John) 
that can have several different properties. Trope theory suggests that 
the correct analysis is by talking about abstract particulars (tropes), 
in this case John’s happiness. Then our test sentence is true iff that 
trope is an element in two sets: the set making up John (explaining 
why we are talking about John’s happiness) and the set of happiness 
tropes (explaining why we can say that both John and Lisa can be 
happy). The two sets serve different purposes. One set makes up the 
object we are talking about, the other is a set of similar tropes, as 
John’s happiness, Lisa’s happiness, and so on. The first set is also 
called the concurrence set of tropes, Con{a}; the second set is the sim-
ilarity set of tropes, Sim{a}. Con{a} makes up the individuals we are 
talking about (since Con{a} consists of John’s happiness, his tallness, 
his colour, and so on), and Sim{a} is the set of tropes that together 
make up F. 
A bit more formally, we can provide truth-conditions for a sen-
tence “a is F” in the following way:2 
 
                                                     
2 An analysis along these lines is provided in Bacon (1989). 
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1. “a is F” is true iff there is a trope b such that b is an element 
in the intersection of Con{a} and Sim{F} 
“John is happy” is true iff there is a trope b which can be found in 
both set set of tropes making up John and in the set of tropes com-
prising all the happinesses in the world. Now consider the sentence 
“a is not composed of tropes”, which in effect says that a is an atom, 
perhaps the ultimate trope, something not consisting of further 
tropes. Then the truth conditions for that sentence would be: 
2. “a is not composed of tropes” is true iff it is not the case that 
“a is composed of tropes” is true 
leading to 
3. “a is not composed of tropes” is true iff it is not the case that 
there is a trope b such that b is an element in the intersection 
of Con{a} and Sim{composed of tropes} 
The property not being composed of tropes can also be expressed as 
being atomic,3 so we have the equivalence 
4. “a is atomic” is true iff it is not the case that there is a trope 
b such that b is an element in the intersection of Con{a} and 
Sim{composed of tropes} 
or we could go for a direct analysis of what “a is atomic” might mean: 
5. “a is atomic” is true iff there is a trope b such that b is an 
element in the intersection of Con{a} and Sim{atomic} 
Combining these two equivalences, we get 
6. there is a trope b such that b is an element in the intersection 
of Con{a} and Sim{atomic} iff it is not the case that there is 
                                                     
3 Can it really? More on this question below. 
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a trope b such that b is an element in the intersection of 
Con{a} and Sim{composed of tropes} 
If the property being atomic is the same as the property not being 
composed of tropes, then Sim{atomic}=Sim{not being composed of 
tropes}. We can call this set A. Then we get 
7. There is a trope b such that b is an element in the intersec-
tion of Con{a} and A iff it is not the case that there is a trope 
b such that b is an element in the intersection of Con{a} and 
A 
We can call Con{a} B. Then we get 
8. There is a trope b such that b is an element in the intersec-
tion of B and A iff it is not the case that there is a trope b 
such that b is an element in the intersection of B and A 
This is the paradoxical 
9. ∃b(b ∈ A ∩ B) ↔ ∈ ¬∃b(b ∈ A ∩ B) 
which spells bad news for trope theory. The question is, how bad? 
At the very least, this shows that more has to be done, that the pro-
posed truth-conditions for sentences of the type “a is F” cannot be 
the whole story. 
In fact, the above formalized argument is a bit of window dress-
ing. There is a more direct and simple argument leading in the same 
direction.  
Assume that something is atomic. Then it has no parts – after all, 
that is what “being atomic” means. But if it has no parts, the trope-
theoretic analysis doesn’t work, since it expressly analyses predica-
tions by distinguishing parts in objects. What is to be done here? 
One way out is to try to distinguish various senses of “being 
atomic”. Perhaps physical atomicity and metaphysical atomicity can 
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and should be distinguished. The most basic, and for the trope the-
orist most relevant, sense is arguably a metaphysical sense, since 
trope theory is a theory about predication, not a contribution to 
physics. Then metaphysical atomicity would mean that something 
has no metaphysical parts, or no parts that surface in an analysis. 
Given the above argument, this notion is in trouble – at the very 
least, we have to say that there are no metaphysical atoms. The no-
tion of being atomic is simply contradictory. Hence atomism, or 
particularism, is false. Let’s see where this thought leads. 
The trope-theoretic version of this kind of thought says that at-
omism is false, and that everything is made up of tropes, ad infini-
tum. In this case, there are no basic building blocks in the world. 
This can perhaps sound like an ad hoc response to the above argu-
ment: it is the only way for the trope theorist to avoid the unpleasant 
consequences of the argument. But perhaps we can say more to sup-
port this view? After all, the debate between metaphysical monism 
and particularism has deep historical roots. 
2. Monism on the cheap? 
The above argument is quite close in spirit to that of Schaffer’s ar-
gument from gunk (Schaffer 2010). Gunk is something non-atomic, 
something where every part of it has parts of its own, and so on, 
lacking ultimate parts. Bringing two lines of thought together, we 
can now say that tropes are gunky: 
 
(1) Either the ultimate parts must be basic at all worlds, or the 
ultimate whole must be basic at all worlds. 
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(2) There are gunky worlds without ultimate parts (and hence 
no ultimate parts to be basic at those worlds). 
(3) The ultimate whole must be basic at all worlds.4 
This is clearly a valid argument, so the truth of (10) and (11) are 
what remains to discuss. A full discussion would have to be the sub-
ject of some other paper. 
Tropes are gunky, so atomism cannot be true, so monism must 
be the true theory about the world. At least I think this is a new 
argument for monism. But it is conditional times two: if trope the-
ory is the best way to handle the one-over-many problem, and if 
truth-conditions for sentences of the form Fa are to be given as sug-
gested in the previous section, then tropes cannot be atoms. And if 
the world cannot contain atoms, there are no particulars making up 
the world. Hence monism is true. Determination basically is a top-
down affair – the world, a whole, is that which determines all the 
other truths. 
Against this, a particularist can say many things. One is to attack 
the assumptions behind the conditional reasoning. This is not the 
place to do that. Another is to try and turn the argument around. 
This is perhaps a more promising strategy, or at least what I will look 
(very briefly) at in the next section. 
3. … or perhaps not 
Turning the argument around is the idea that we can argue to show 
that the world is junky – the idea that every whole is part of some 
                                                     
4 This is the argument as presented in Schaffer (2018) § 3.2.3. 
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bigger whole (Bohn 2009). If this is the case, then there is no ulti-
mate whole that grounds everything else. If the world is gunky, no 
ultimate particulars exist, and if the world is junky, no ultimate 
wholes exist. Why would anyone think that there could be no ulti-
mate wholes? Again, a fuller discussion would have to wait for some 
other time. 
The most intriguing way forward here is that talk about ultimate 
wholes appears to talk about everything, in some unqualified way 
which puts us on a sure path to paradox. What is this complete 
whole that is supposed to be prior to its parts? This would have to 
be an absolute infinity: nothing greater of which it is a part could be 
conceived. But now we must tread carefully. 
The set theoretic paradoxes that keep threatening to arise when 
we try to talk about everything can perhaps – perhaps – be tamed, 
but the way they keep popping up should at least give the over-con-
fident monist pause for thought.5 Talking about everything has costs 
of its own. 
Back to the drawing board. 
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The Bottom-Up, the Top-Down, 
and the Maurinian Analysis of 
Similarity Classes 
Ingvar Johansson 
1. Introductory words about philosophical 
discussions 
When relaxing, after an intense discussion with a philosophical op-
ponent, one may happily conclude: “Nice, I don’t have to rethink 
anything.” Or, one may end up a bit distressed saying: “Damned, I 
have to revise some of my views.” Anna-Sofia Maurin is an opponent 
of mine with respect to the existence of universals; and we have had 
a journal exchange about it (Johansson 2007, 2010; Maurin 2007, 
2009, 2010). I am since long quite relaxed about the outcome: “Let’s 
agree that we disagree.”  
However, when this state entered my mind, it was accompanied 
neither by the reaction “Nice” nor by “Damned.” Instead it was: 
“Interesting, I need not revise my belief in universals, but there is a 
lacuna in my defense that I ought to think more about.”   
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One lacuna I became aware of already when reading what made 
me start the discussion, namely (Maurin 2007). In my defenses of 
universals, I should have added some words about the distinction 
between vicious and benign infinite regresses; not written as if all are 
vicious. Later, because of the discussion, I also realized that I ought 
to say more about the relation exact similarity (resemblance), since it 
plays an essential role in my argument for the existence of universals. 
Now I will do so.   
For brevity’s sake, I will in what follows often abstract “exact” 
away from “exact similarity (resemblance),” and talk simply of the 
similarity (resemblance) relation.  
Also, I will focus on where the relation has two distinct relata, 
neither more nor less. Since the binary similarity relation is transi-
tive, it can be used to analyze similarity classes with more than two 
members. On the other hand, since the relation predicate “similar” 
is reflexive, it can be applied to a single entity, too, as in “a is similar 
to a.” In such cases, however, we meet only empty tautological 
truths, and they cannot be used to analyze anything. 
Soon, I will say some explanatory words about the expressions 
“bottom-up” and “top-down,” but in the next paragraph I use them 
unexplained.   
Similarity classes are constituted by a similarity relation in tandem 
with the members of the class. In my opinion, the similarity relation 
has to be understood as emerging bottom-up from the members of 
the class. Resemblance nominalists, to the contrary, make the mem-
bers of the class emerge as such top-down from the similarity relation 
to its relata. Maurin tries with her trope theory to steer a middle 
course between these to her Scylla and Charybdis in the ontological 
ocean.   
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2. Maurin, the trope nominalist, and I, the 
immanent realist  
The central difference between Maurin’s ontological views and mine 
can be stated thus: she claims that there is no need to postulate prop-
erty and relation universals, tropes can do the work that universals 
do for realists, whereas I think that we cannot make ontological sense 
of the universe in which we live without postulating immanently 
existing universals. She is a trope nominalist of sorts; first put for-
ward in (2002). I am an immanent realist of sorts; best presented in 
(2014). I defend the existence not only of property and relation uni-
versals, but of tropes and relation-tropes, too. I am not denying her 
view that there are tropes, but she is denying mine that there are 
universals. A universals-plus-tropes ontology can also be found in 
philosophers such as E. Husserl, J. Cook Wilson, D.W. Mertz, 
E.J. Lowe, and J. Heil. 
In her construction of what from my point of view is a substitute 
for property universals, Maurin claims that property universals, cor-
rectly conceived, are equivalence classes of tropes held together by a sim-
ilarity relation. Her complete ontology, therefore, contains not only 
tropes, but in some sense classes and similarity relations, too: ”all en-
tities that exist besides tropes are constructed from tropes […] saying 
that there is nothing but tropes is to say that tropes are the only 
metaphysically fundamental entities” (Maurin 2002: 5).   
Maurin uses the class concept as if it is not in need of discussion; 
unlike Quine, though, she cannot possibly regard classes as univer-
sals. However, I leave the ontology of classes outside of this paper, 
and focus here only on the similarity relation.1  
                                                     
1 I discuss Quine in my (2016), and my view of classes is put forward in (2015).   
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3. The notions of bottom-up and top-down 
The metaphors bottom-up and top-down can be exchanged for 
more precise concepts, but depending on background assumptions 
such precisifications may differ ontologically. I would nonetheless 
like to say some words about how I look upon the metaphors.  
In Platonist ontologies, the top-down notion is fitting. All iden-
tities/essences/natures down in our spatiotemporal world are re-
garded as derived from eternal entities up in a mind-independently 
existing world of ideas. This-worldly entities are claimed to get their 
qualitative identities thanks to a kind of participation in essences ex-
isting in another realm. Such ontologies I see no reason to bother 
about.   
However, the top-down notion comes naturally also in ontologies 
that posit a creative mind as a top-level entity. In such ontologies, a 
mind is regarded as being able to create and project identities down 
on pre-given entities that in themselves lack such an identity. For 
instance, a mind may create and project a resemblance down on two 
entities that in themselves are not similar. Call such a view subjective 
emergentism.  
Carefully seen, however, this view has a consequence that places 
it outside the topic of this paper. In subjective emergentism, the 
seemingly binary similarity relation is turned into a ternary relation. 
There is no longer a direct and unmediated binary similarity relation 
between two relata. Instead, there is a three-term relation that brings 
in also a mind. Such similarities can be represented by the three-
term expression “similarity(relatum1, relatum2, a mind).”  
The kind of minds and ternary relations just mentioned are absent 
from Maurin’s analyses, and also from those of resemblance nomi-
nalists’. Maurin says: “unless otherwise indicated, the resemblance 
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we are dealing with is objective and primitive” (2002: 80). Therefore, 
I confine my discussions to the truly binary similarity relation.  
In common sense, the bottom-up conception of relations comes 
naturally. Normally, we discuss possible relations by investigating 
the relata of the presumed relations. With respect to the similarity 
relation, this means that if the relata have the same kind of property, 
then they are similar; otherwise not. As far as I am concerned, com-
mon sense may well be ascribed an implicit belief in property uni-
versals. This does not mean that I think that common sense is a re-
liable source for finding truths. To the contrary. But I happen to 
believe that a non-commonsensical proof can be given to the effect 
that there are both tropes and property universals (Johansson 2014). 
Contemporary analytic philosophy contains attempts to find an 
asymmetric relation that might be used to characterize the asym-
metry contained in both the bottom-up and the top-down concep-
tions of similarity. This is not the place to discuss them, but I will 
briefly mention two proposals and my preferred alternative.  
First, if the notion in virtue of is taken as primitive, then in the 
bottom-up approach the similarity relation exists in virtue of the na-
ture of the relata. In the top-down approach, the natures of the relata 
exist in virtue of the similarity relation.  
Second, if a relation of metaphysical grounding is taken as ontolog-
ically basic (and not as defined by an in-virtue-of relation), then in 
the bottom-up approach similarity relations are regarded as 
grounded in the nature of their relata, whereas in the top-down ap-
proach the natures of the relata are regarded as grounded in the sim-
ilarity relation.  
Third, I have since the mid-80s worked with a notion somewhat 
similar to the ones mentioned. I have taken it from Husserl, and I 
call it one-sided existential dependence (Johansson 2004: ch. 9.3). Us-
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ing this notion, the bottom-up approach claims that similarity rela-
tions are one-sidedly dependent on their relata, which means that 
similarities cannot possibly exist without their relata, whereas each 
of these relata can exist even if the relation does not exist. The top-
down approach, conversely, claims that neither relatum can exist 
with its nature if the similarity relation does not exist, but the simi-
larity relation can in some way exist without the relata.  
Using a wide concept of explanation, one may say that in the bot-
tom-up approach the similarity relation is meant to be explained by 
the nature of its relata, and that in the top-down approach the na-
tures of the relata are meant to be explained by the similarity rela-
tion.  
4. Maurin, I, and resemblance nominalism 
I take resemblance nominalism to be definable as essentially contain-
ing the top-down approach. “In short, in Resemblance Nominalism 
resemblance among concrete particulars is not explained, but is used 
to explain the properties of these particulars” (Rodriguez-Pereyra 
2002: 26).2 The general approach may then be specified in different 
ways by different philosophers. One philosopher may try to use the 
in-virtue-of relation, another may use grounding, and a third one 
                                                     
2 Despite calling himself a resemblance nominalist according to the characteriza-
tion presented, Rodriguez-Pereyra also makes the astonishing claim that there 
are no resemblances! Only as-if resemblances: “although there are resembling 
particulars, there is no entity over and above them that is their resemblance. […] 
But for ease and simplicity of exposition I shall talk throughout the book about 
resemblance as if it were an entity, that is, a relation” (ibid.: 62). This statement 
simply contradicts his view that resemblance facts are objective (ibid.). As-if facts 
are subjective mind-phenomena. As has been noted before, his position is “an 
ontological version of the Indian rope trick” (Svennerlind 2008: 135n).   
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one-sided existential dependence. I think all three kinds of resem-
blance nominalism founder when confronted with the following 
simple line of thought. 
Most ontologists accept in their argumentation far-reaching 
thought experiments, and I am no exception. Let us first imagine a 
two-trope world where there are only two tropes, t and t#, and no 
similarities whatsoever; call it world-(A). Let us then in thought en-
ter another two-trope world, world-(B), where t# has been exchanged 
for t*, and where t and t* are exactly similar. This world contains not 
only two tropes, but a similarity-trope, too. Third, let us imagine a 
one-trope world, world-(C), by deleting t*; it cannot possibly con-
tain a similarity relation with two distinct relata.  
In the move from world-(A) to world-(C), it seems unproblematic 
to think of t as being the same in all the three worlds, and therefore 
as having the same nature in all three. What, then, are here the op-
tions for resemblance nominalists? For them to claim that t has no 
nature in world-(C) seems absurd. And for them to claim that t has 
a nature because “t is similar to t” makes their approach to relations 
with distinct relata superfluous. The sentence “x is similar to x” is 
true for all entities independently of their similarity to other entities. 
However, to argue for a superfluous analysis is absurd. Therefore, 
on either option, resemblance nominalism falls prey to a reductio ad 
absurdum. 
What, then, does Maurin say about resemblance nominalism?  
[C]ompare the standard view [of tropes] with a view with which it 
is often confused: resemblance nominalism. On trope theory, tropes 
have the same nature if they resemble each other, and they resemble 
each other (or not) in virtue of the (primitive) nature they each ‘have’ 
(or ‘are’). According to resemblance nominalism, on the other hand, 
two objects have the natures they do in virtue of the resemblance 
relations which obtain between them. This means that, whether 
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they resemble or not, is not decided given the existence and nature 
of the objects themselves. Rather, the pattern of dependence is the 
other way around. […] Perhaps for that reason, resemblance nom-
inalism has no explicit proponent among the trope theorists. (2018: 
endnote 28) 
When, in the next section, I discuss Maurin’s analysis of the similar-
ity relation, I can do so quite confident that both of us find resem-
blance nominalism incredible.  
5. The Maurinian analysis: invoking pseudo-
additions and haecceity-natures  
Let me use an example to make the discussion more concrete. Look 
at the spots within the square brackets: [ ●  ● ]. Each spot contains 
at least both a color-trope and a shape-trope. The color-tropes (being 
black) may be regarded as existing only in our perceptual fields, but 
the shape-tropes (being circular) may be ascribed a mind-independ-
ent existence. Now, whatever kind of tropes the reader would like to 
regard as being acceptable, let’s call the left trope t and the right one 
t*. The tropes are exactly similar, S. 
With respect to the example, Maurin and I do on an abstract se-
mantic level share the following views:  
 
(i) t and t* are two different tropes, and as such each has a na-
ture; 
(ii) they are related by a similarity-trope, S;  
(iii) necessarily, if t and t* exist, then S exists; 
(iv) necessarily, if S exists, then there are two relata, t and t*; 
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(v) t can exist even if t* does not, and vice versa, which – to-
gether with (iv) – entails that t and t* can exist separately 
even if there is no S. 
 
The differences between us pop up when we specify the term “trope 
nature” in (i) and the second occurrence of “exist” in (iii). I start 
with the latter.   
Maurin says: “Resemblance may be understood in one of two 
ways: either as a pseudo-addition or as a genuine relation-trope” 
(2005: 138). For me, the second occurrence of “exist” in (iii) has the 
same sense as the first, which means that for me S is a genuine rela-
tion-trope that exists just as much as the tropes do. Maurin, on the 
other hand, allows my use of “exist” to have two senses: t and t* 
genuinely exist, but S only pseudo-exists. The presumed latter fact 
is what allows her to reject the bottom-up approach that statement 
(iii) may seem to imply. According to Maurin, there really is no 
“up,” only a “pseudo-up.” To her, S is not only (as for me) less on-
tologically fundamental than t and t*, S is merely an ontological 
pseudo-addition. She says: 
This will leave us with the third and final view [which is Maurin’s 
option], a view according to which exact resemblance should be on-
tologically characterized as a pseudo-addition to our basic metaphys-
ical scheme. (2002: 94)  
She is from the start well aware of the fact that the term “pseudo” 
may in ontological contexts sound odd: “the invocation of ‘unreal’ 
additions to solve philosophical problems may seem nothing short 
of magic” (ibid.). And then she goes on to defend her view (2002: 
109–115). After criticism, she briefly defends the notion of pseudo-
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addition again (2005: footnote 23). For good criticism, see (Sven-
nerlind 2008: 129–142). In her SEP entry “Tropes,” she uses the 
notion in passing: “the trope theorist had the option of treating the 
relation [resemblance] as a ‘pseudo-addition’” (2018: sect. 3.2). To 
my mind, her argumentation proves only that S is less fundamental 
than t and t*. 
Next the term “trope nature.” To me, a trope’s nature is a univer-
sal, since I regard a trope as an instance of a universal. To Maurin, 
on the other hand, the nature of a trope is as particular as the trope 
itself. Moreover, she regards them as identical: “tropes are nothing 
but their particular nature” (2002: 93). At least in everyday talk, the 
term “nature” has connotations that make it refer to something re-
peatable. My use conforms to this, Maurin’s does not. From medie-
val scholasticism I will now borrow the term “haecceity,” which 
means thisness in contrast to universality. I will use it, for the sake 
of verbal clarity, to call Maurin’s trope natures haecceity-natures. 
That is, natures that, necessarily, can be the nature of only one en-
tity. 
Looking at the history of European philosophy, one finds some 
entities that are regarded as having a haecceity-nature. First, Plato’s 
mind-independently existing Ideas. There cannot be two Ideas that 
are exactly similar. Then there are Aristotle’s the Unmoved mover 
and God in scholastic philosophy. All these entities have this feature: 
nothing else can possibly resemble them exactly. Exact similarity be-
tween trope natures, however, is absolutely central to Maurin’s trope 
theory: “similarity relations do not afford us, but are rather a conse-
quence of, the nature of individual tropes” (2010: 47; my transla-
tion). In spite of the fact that the haecceity-natures of tropes differ 
from the other ones mentioned, Maurin never explicates her notion 
of trope nature, i.e., a trope’s particularity. After some reasoning, she 
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concludes: “we must therefore simply accept the particularity of the 
trope as primitive” (2002: 21). 
Conclusion: there is a lacuna in Maurin’s defense of the view that 
each and every trope has its own haecceity-nature. 
6. Concluding Russellian words about discussions of 
relations 
Bertrand Russell, who was a firm believer in the existence of both 
property and relation universals, put forward the following claim in 
1924:    
The question of relations is one of the most important that arise in 
philosophy, as most other issues turn on it: monism and pluralism; 
the question whether anything is wholly true except the whole of 
truth, or wholly real except the whole of reality; idealism and real-
ism in some of their forms; perhaps the very existence of philosophy 
as a subject distinct from science and possessing a method of its 
own. (Russell 1956: 333) 
If what Russell says is true, then I hope to have shown that his list 
of opposing positions can definitely be augmented by the one be-
tween immanent realism and trope nominalism.  
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A Little Dialogue on Extensionality 
(and music) 
Jeroen Smid 
Anna: So we agree that objects are bundles of tropes? 
Sofia: Trope bundle theory is ontologically very parsimonious and it 
nicely avoids Bradley’s regress. It definitely has a lot going for it 
(Maurin 2002, 2010, 2011). 
Anna: But? 
Sofia: Well, trope theory concerns one area of metaphysics but there 
are other areas, too. If my favourite theory in one of those other areas 
doesn’t fit with trope bundle theory, I might give up on tropes. 
Anna: “If…” Well, trope theory fits well with extensional mereology, 
especially if tropes are literally parts of an object. For it makes sense 
then to say that having the same part (i.e., tropes) is sufficient for 
identity. We can then have a mereological trope bundle theory.  
Sofia: I thought about this, too; but I do have a worry. For if instead 
we have good reasons to deny extensionality, we might have to say 
that different objects can share a single trope. The statue and the 
clay, for example, might have one and the same mass trope although 
they are distinct. But tropes, it seems, are not shareable. There are 
other ways to respond… 
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Anna (interrupting): Can we please not talk about the statue and the 
freaking clay! The example bores me and honestly, I don’t think it 
shows two objects can have exactly the same parts (Smid 2017).  
Sofia: Fair enough! And regardless of the question whether non-ex-
tensional mereologies are compatible with (mereological) trope bun-
dle theories, I like fussing about extensionality. 
Anna: Let’s first get clear about parthood. When I talk about par-
thood I mean proper parthood: the relation holding, for example, be-
tween my hand and me. And by ‘part’ I mean proper or improper 
part, i.e. the thing itself. 
Sofia: So, proper part is an irreflexive, transitive, and asymmetric re-
lation. 
Anna: Best to stay neutral (for now) on asymmetry—some philoso-
phers think distinct objects can be proper parts of each other 
(Thomson 1983, 1998; Cotnoir 2010, 2016). 
Sofia: For example, the statue and the…, err, sorry, I mean, a bottle 
and its plastic are then mutual parts? 
Anna: Exactly. So shall we say that proper parthood is irreflexive and 
transitive? 
Sofia: But the asymmetry of proper parthood then follows: if x is a 
proper part of y and y is a proper part of x, then—by transitivity—x 
is a proper part of x. But this is impossible given irreflexivity.  
Anna: Yes, of course. So, maybe we should say that either proper 
parthood is irreflexive and transitive (and thus asymmetric) or it is 
irreflexive and restrictedly transitive? 
Sofia: Restrictedly transitive? 
Anna: Yes: if x is a proper part of y and z is not identical with y and 
z is a proper part of x, then z is a proper part of y. 
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Sofia: That seems fine. And, maybe as a third option, we should al-
low for proper parthood to be transitive, but neither irreflexive nor 
asymmetric.  
Anna: I doubt we are still talking about a single notion of par-
thood…  
Sofia: If necessary, we can formulate different theories for different 
parthood relations. In any case, whether proper parthood is a strict 
partial order or something weaker, we need some remainder princi-
ple that does justice to the idea that a proper part of an object is not 
the whole object. If you take away a (proper) part of an object, there 
should be something that remains. 
Anna: Plenty to choose from: 
Quasi-Supplementation: If x is a proper part of y, then y has two 
parts, w and z, such that w and z do not overlap. 
Weak Supplementation: If x is a proper part of y, then y has a part z 
that does not overlap x. 
Strong Supplementation: If x is not a part of y, then some part of x 
does not overlap y. 
Sofia: I assume that ‘overlap’ simply means sharing an improper 
part?  
Anna: Yes, so I overlap myself; Skåne overlaps Sweden because it is 
a proper part of Sweden; and your flat overlaps with your neigh-
bours’ flat because they share a wall. 
Sofia: A rather thin wall… 
Anna: At least you have a stuga. 
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Sofia: True that. Anyway, do we have to determine “The Only True 
Supplementation Principle” before we can address the question of 
extensionality? 
Anna: Nope. Let’s just agree that any counterexample to extension-
ality must respect at least one of these supplementation principles. 
Otherwise the counterexample proves too much. 
Sofia: Why? 
Anna: Well, even those who deny extensionality think at least one 
of these three principles must be true. (Simons 1987: 116; Cotnoir 
2016: 125–127; Gilmore forthcoming) Which makes sense, because 
it seems that we are only willing to say that x is a proper part of y if 
x is not all of y: something besides x should also be part of y.  
Sofia: Sure. So we consider a counterexample to extensionality legit 
only if it does not violate all three supplementation principles.  
Anna: And, to be on the same page, the extensionality principle 
states: 
Extensionality: If x and y have proper parts and they have all the 
same proper parts, then x = y. 
Sofia: Moreover our counterexamples shouldn’t concern sculptures. 
Anna: Please! 
*** 
Sofia: I think I found some counterexamples (Walters 2019: 36).  
Anna: Do tell. 
Sofia: So, consider the words ‘no’ and ‘on’. They are distinct, yet 
have the same parts. 
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Anna: I assume you are talking about the word types here, not their 
tokens since the tokens have different (token) parts. 
Sofia: Of course. 
Anna: Hmm, but then consider the word type ‘feel’. If ‘ee’ is a proper 
part of ‘feel’, then ‘e’ is also a proper part of ‘ee’. But this example 
then violates both Quasi and Weak Supplementation since ‘ee’ only 
has a single proper part, ‘e’ (Varzi 2019: sec. 3.2). 
Anna: But Strong Supplementation is not violated by this example? 
Sofia: Well, since everything that is part of ‘ee’ overlaps ‘e’ we get—
by the contrapositive of Strong Supplementation—that ‘ee’ is a part 
of ‘e’. That’s just wrong. 
Sofia: OK, but what about lexemes, for example, the word ‘bank’ 
can mean ‘financial institution’ or ‘land alongside a river’ (Walters 
2019: 36)? 
Anna: Sure, the word ‘bank’ is homonymous and can thus express 
two lexemes, both spelled ‘bank’ but one meaning FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTION and the other meaning RIVER BANK. But what are the 
parts of those lexemes? 
Sofia: Surely, the letters are parts of the lexemes. 
Anna: I think you are confusing words and lexemes here. The words 
‘go’, ‘going’, and ‘went’ are all forms—inflictions—of a single lex-
eme, GO. Lexemes are instead, I think, best regarded as simple ob-
jects; the meaningful units of a language that can be inflicted by dif-
ferent words of that language. However, suppose instead that letters 
are parts of lexemes. In that case, we end up in the same situation as 
before, right? If letters and lexemes are types, then all supplementa-
tion principles fail because such types allow for objects that have a 
single proper part.  
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Sofia: What if we consider the tokens instead? So that every word 
token of ‘bank’ expresses two lexemes. 
Anna: Well, then there is still no problem with Extensionality: we 
have four letter tokens that are part of a single word token—
‘bank’—that happens to have two meanings.  
Sofia: This is proving to be more difficult than I thought. 
Anna: I know. But you inspired me. Consider works of art (Walters 
2019: 36). 
Sofia: Are you going to be the one to bring up a sculpture after all? 
Anna: Of course not! I was thinking of music. Consider two pieces 
of music that are, note for note, exactly the same. They are, however, 
distinct pieces of music because different composers wrote them 
and, as such, they have different qualities. 
Sofia: Not sure I agree it is possible that two distinct pieces of music 
can be note for note the same (Dodd 2007). But suppose it is possi-
ble, for sake of the argument.  
Anna: Well, this is sort of the whole argument: the pieces of music 
are composed of the same notes (i.e., they have the same parts) but 
they are nonetheless distinct. 
Sofia: OK, bear with me, I am going to get metaphysical… what is 
a piece of music?  
Anna: Aristotle, here we come… 
Sofia: I mean, is a piece of music a performance, or the fusion of its 
performances? Is it its score? Or is it an abstract type, existing inde-
pendently of its performances and score?  
Anna: Does it matter? 
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Sofia: Of course! Say we identify a piece of music with its perfor-
mances and thus say that, since the two pieces are distinct, perfor-
mances of the one are not performances of the other, and vice versa. 
By parity of reasoning the pieces of music then don’t have the same 
parts either. The first few bars played of one performance are only 
part of that piece of music that is being performed, but not of the 
other piece.  
Anna: Can’t I say that every performance is a performance of both 
pieces of music? In that case they do have the same parts. 
Sofia: Not so fast. Why did you say the pieces of music were distinct? 
Anna: Well, they might have different aesthetic qualities: since the 
composers may be from different traditions, one piece may be 
weirder, more controversial, or more upsetting than the other 
(Levinson 1980: 11). 
Sofia: A maiore ad minus. 
Anna: Omnia dicta fortiora si dicta Latina. 
Sofia: Sorry. I mean: if the pieces of music are distinct, then some of 
their parts are, too. It’s not that the difference between the pieces (if 
there is one) is noticed only at the level of the whole. The part con-
sisting of all but the final three notes is probably also weirder, more 
controversial, or more upsetting than the analogous part of the other 
piece. Hence, you should say that they do not have the same parts 
after all. And I could say the same of one particular note. That note 
may, in the first piece, have a different quality than in the second 
piece, because of the place the whole piece occupies in a musical 
tradition. So even on the smallest level there is a difference in their 
parts (Cf. Varzi 2008: 115ff).  
Anna: What if I identify a piece of music instead with its score? 
Sofia: So the scores have the same notes, but they are nonetheless 
distinct? 
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Anna: Yes, exactly. 
Sofia: But how is this a counterexample to extensionality? I mean: if 
we talk about tokens of scores then fine, piece A is distinct from 
piece B. But no note written on one score is also, as a token, written 
on another score. So, again, they do not have the same parts. 
Anna: Yeah, so let’s say scores are types, not tokens.    
Sofia: Well, then we end up in the same boat as with word types: a 
motif consisting of two or more of the same notes will have a proper 
part violating all three supplementation principles. 
Anna: OK. This turns out to be much harder than I thought… Fika? 
Sofia: Fika! 
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Armstrong’s Truthmaker Argument 
for the Existence of States of Affairs 
Revisited 
Robin Stenwall 
Consider David Armstrong’s famous argument for why contingent 
predications require the existence of states of affairs in order to be 
made true (1997: 113-16).1 Let some particular a instantiate univer-
sal F, and assume that there are possible worlds in which a is not F. 
Is there an entity which makes it true that a is F? In view of Truth-
maker Necessitarianism (i.e. the principle according to which a 
truthmaker necessitates the truth of the proposition(s) it makes 
true),2 the truthmaker cannot be a itself. The particular might not 
have been an F, in which case there will be possible worlds where a 
exists but where it is false that a is F.3 Nor can the truthmaker be the 
pair of a and F-ness, since both entities could exist and it still not be 
                                                     
1 What follows is a more elaborate version of one of the arguments given in Sten-
wall (2016).  
2 I will assume that propositions are the primary bearers of truth, although noth-
ing essential hinges on this assumption.  
3 For illustrative purposes, I will engage in talk about possible worlds without 
thereby ontologically committing myself to such entities.  
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true that a is F (given that properties cannot exist unexemplified, F 
could be instantiated by some other particular b). Consequently, the 
argument goes, there has to exist something in addition to a and F-
ness to make the proposition that a is F true. And if we are to believe 
Armstrong, this is the state of affairs a’s being F, since in every pos-
sible world where that state of affairs exist, it will also be true that a 
is F.   
With this in mind, let us follow Armstrong and take the proposi-
tion that the ball is red to be made true by the state of affairs, the 
ball’s being red. Unlike the ball itself or the joint existence of the ball 
and redness, there are no possible worlds where that state of affairs 
exists, but where it fails to be true that the ball is red. The question 
is whether the necessity that the state confers is somehow a conse-
quence of (or essentially related to) the truthmaking abilities of that 
state. Armstrong thinks that it is. For the state, he reasons, would 
not qualify as a truthmaker if it did not necessitate the truth of the 
proposition in question (2004: 5-7). But why is that? Why can’t the 
necessity that the state confers rather be a consequence of its being 
both a necessary and sufficient condition for the transworld identity 
of states of affairs that they contain the same constituents organized 
in the same manner?4 
Consider the case of the mad metaphysician, Milo. Milo thinks, 
contrary to Armstrong and very much contrary to fact, that the 
transworld identity of states of affairs does not supervene on their 
structural composition and, consequently, that what ‘ball’s being red’ 
refers to in this world could have been constituted by, say, the ball 
and blueness.5 If Milo is correct, the non-structural state of affairs—
                                                     
4 Notice that this has to be assumed independently of Truthmaker Necessitarian-
ism in order for Armstrong’s argument to work.  
5 For the sake of brevity, I shall use the term ’non-structural states of affairs’ to re-
fer to states of affairs whose identity is not given by their structural composition. 
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call it ‘Bob’—would not necessitate the truth of the proposition in 
question, since there are worlds where Bob exists, but where it is 
nonetheless false that the ball is red. The non-structural state of af-
fairs will only make the proposition true in worlds like the actual 
where Bob is constituted by the ball and redness. But Milo takes this 
to be a contingent fact. So there are, according to the mad metaphy-
sician, possible worlds where the same exact state of affairs obtains, 
but where the proposition is false. Yet it is hard to see why this lack 
of necessitation on behalf of Bob would deprive the non-structural 
state of affairs the status of being a truthmaker for the proposition 
that the ball is red. For it is clear that the existence of Bob is enough 
to make it true that the ball is red—this, despite the lack of necessita-
tion by that state of affairs. What goes on at possible worlds other 
than the actual is totally irrelevant to the question of what makes the 
proposition true in the world in which it is evaluated. That Bob 
could have been constituted by the ball and blueness has no bearing 
whatsoever on the truthmaking abilities of that state. Why should 
it? As long as the state of affairs makes it the case that the ball is red 
in this world, it would seem that there is no reason to take any oth-
erworldly inhabitants into account.  
Armstrong, however, thinks that a truthmaker whose existence 
merely contingently suffices to make a certain proposition true is 
‘incomplete’: 
If it is said that the truthmaker for a truth could have failed to make 
the truth true, then we will surely think that the alleged truthmaker 
was insufficient by itself and requires to be supplemented in some 
way. A contingently sufficient truthmaker will [make it] true only 
in circumstances that obtain in this world. But then these circum-
stances, whatever they are, must be added to give the full truth-
maker. (Armstrong 1997: 116) 
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But in the present case it makes no sense to require that Bob be sup-
plemented with the actual circumstances. The non-structural state 
of affairs is only a truthmaker for the proposition that the ball is red 
under circumstances that obtain in this world, where the state of 
affairs is constituted by the ball and redness. But since by supposi-
tion it is true that the ball is red solely in virtue of Bob, it follows 
that there is nothing of relevance in addition to that state of affairs 
to be added. And if Armstrong means to say that something has to 
exist in this world that does not exist in a world where it is false that 
the ball is red,6 and that this existence must be incorporated into the 
truthmaker, he begs the question. For then, to claim that the truth-
maker is “insufficient by itself” amounts to nothing more than the 
claim that the truth of the proposition is not necessitated by that 
which makes it true (Skiles 2015: 737). But to infer that the “in-
complete” truthmaker therefore be supplemented with the actual 
circumstances is to presuppose what the argument is meant to estab-
lish, namely Truthmaker Necessitarianism. We still need an inde-
pendent argument showing that this supplement, assuming it exists, 
would have to be added to Bob in order for it to be true that the ball 
is red (Cameron 2008: 109-12). Until then, there is no reason to 
assume that truthmakers must necessitate the truth of that which 
they make true.   
Let me be clear about what I have been arguing. First of all, I do 
not claim that the identity of states of affairs does not supervene on 
their structural composition—it most certainly does. However, the 
                                                     
6 Milo, of course, denies that truth supervenes on existence in that he allows for 
possible worlds that are exactly alike with respect to what exists but that none-
theless differ with respect to what is true. However, Milo is not mad enough to 
deny that truth supervenes on being. He is in agreement with the likes of Lewis 
(2001) and others who think that for any two worlds exactly alike with respect 
to what exists and which properties (and relations) each of those existents exem-
plifies are also exactly alike with respect to what is true.   
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reason we should reject a non-structural identity condition for states 
of affairs is not because it would make the truthmaking relation con-
tingent, but because it would make transworld identification of 
states of affairs, if not unintelligible, at least difficult. To conflate the 
role of states of affairs to be identifiable across possible worlds with 
their role to provide grounds for truth muddles the discussion and 
gives importance to modality where none is merited. Secondly, I do 
not deny that certain truths are made true by states of affairs. There 
are independent reasons to suggest that the proposition that the ball 
is red is made true by the ball’s being red, rather than, say, the ball 
itself. But this has everything to do with the fact that the ball is red 
and nothing to do with the ball’s being red necessitating the truth of 
the proposition that the ball is red. Suppose, for the purpose of a 
reductio, that the truth of the proposition that the ball is red is made 
true by the ball. The ball is not only red; it is also of a determinate 
mass, volume, shape and so forth. So if the ball does indeed make it 
true that the ball is red, it also makes true various other (non-rela-
tional) predications involving the ball. But this seems wrong from 
the perspective of truthmaker theory. The idea that truth depends 
on being is the idea that different truths depend on different por-
tions of reality. And what makes it true that the ball is red is not 
what make is true that the ball has the shape it has. What makes it 
true that the ball is red is that it is red, and what makes it true that 
the ball has the shape it has is that it is ball-shaped (cf. Rodriguez-
Pereyra 2005: 23). It might be that Armstrong is correct to point 
out that this ‘is’ is not the ‘is’ of identity, but that of instantiation—
a fundamental, non-relational tie between particular and property 
(1978: 108-11). If so, then the instantiation of a property by a par-
ticular is simply the state of affairs itself. Thus, to say that the prop-
osition that the ball is red is true in virtue of the ball instantiating 
redness is just to say that the proposition is made true by the state of 
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affairs the ball’s being red. The state cannot exist and it be false that 
the ball is red. This neither is nor should be denied. What is and 
should be denied is that this necessity is somehow a consequence of, 
or essentially related to, the state making it true that the ball is red. 
The ball instantiating the colour it actually has (whatever colour that 
may be) is, in the world in which the evaluation is made, sufficient 
to make the corresponding attribution true. In this world the ball 
exists and is red. And this is enough to make it true that the ball is 
red, irrespectively of whatever colour the ball happens to exemplify 
in any other world of evaluation.  
This not only goes to show that Armstrong’s truthmaker argu-
ment for the existence of states of affairs rests on a faulty assumption, 
but also that Truthmaker Contingentism can be extended to include 
not only the negative (Stenwall 2017) and general truths (Cameron 
2005 and Briggs 2012), but also the atomic truths. What is more, 
necessitarianism has no explanatory role to play in arguing that states 
of affairs must be included in the ontological catalogue, and the ne-
cessity that states of affairs confer on truth can be explained away by 
the fact that their transworld identity supervenes on their structural 
composition.   
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Bradley, Compositionality and 
Davidson 
Martin L. Jönsson 
Once upon a time, I wrote my Bachelor’s thesis on Bradley’s regress 
– an argument purporting to undermine, ultimately, the idea that 
there can be complex wholes (cf. Bradley 1893) – a topic that Anna-
Sofia Maurin has concerned herself with, on several occasions (Mau-
rin 2002, 2010, 2012), to the considerable benefit of the rest of us. 
When I, a few years later, got admitted as a Ph.D.-student, I ended 
up writing my dissertation (Jönsson 2008) on a quite different topic, 
the principle of compositionality – the thesis that the meaning of a 
complex expression is determined by its parts and its mode of com-
position.  
Although seemingly related, I never explored the connection be-
tween these two topics in writing, since my transition between the 
two was far from continuous. In my dissertation I acknowledged 
only a prerequisite for the transition: the kind encouragement given 
to me in relation to my work on Bradley’s regress, by, among others, 
Anna-Sofia. It seems fitting then, as a small token of my gratitude 
for her early encouragement, as well as later inspiring collegiality, for 
me to write something on the occasion of her 50th birthday about 
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the relation between Bradley’s regress and the principle of composi-
tionality.  
1. Davidson’s regress argument    
A suitably narrow focus of attention, given the space allotted to me 
by the conscientious editors and my nexus of interest, is a brief, 
Bradleyan, argument in Donald Davidson’s paper “Truth and 
Meaning”. In what follows I will briefly relate three interpretations 
of this argument to compositionality arguments roughly in the same 
line of work. The mere juxtaposition will have to be enough; space 
prohibits assessing the strength of these interpretations (and thus 
Bradley’s regress) in any detail.   
In the paper, Davidson is concerned with how the meaning of a 
complex expression depends upon the meanings of its parts. The 
second paragraph of the paper reads as follows: 
One proposal is to begin by assigning some entity as meaning to 
each word (or other significant syntactical feature) of the sentence; 
thus we might assign Theaetetus to ‘Theaetetus’ and the property 
of flying to ‘flies’ in the sentence ‘Theaetetus flies’. The problem 
then arises how the meaning of the sentence is generated from these 
meanings. Viewing concatenation as a significant piece of syntax, 
we may assign to it the relation of participating in or instantiating; 
however, it is obvious that we have here the start of an infinite re-
gress. (Davidson 1967: 304) 
Davidson here discusses a simple semantic theory S according to 
which the meanings of expressions and syntactic structures alike, are 
entities of some sort, where ‘entity’ is understood broadly enough to 
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include particulars (persons), properties, and relations. And he dis-
misses this theory, due to it generating a regress. 
How is the regress generated? This is not obvious.   
According to Davidson, the starting point of the regress is when 
S identifies the meaning of concatenation with the instantiation re-
lation as a way to explain DPC, Davidson’s Primary Concern (in 
‘Truth and Meaning’): how the meaning of a sentence is generated 
from the meanings of the parts of that sentence.  
It is clear to see that to thusly identify the meaning of concatena-
tion is not sufficient in itself to account for the meaning of ‘The-
aetetus flies'. In particular, the meaning of ‘Theaetetus flies’ cannot 
be identified with the meaning of concatenation, since ‘Theaetetus 
flies’ and ‘Theaetetus weeps’, and all other pairs of concatenated 
words, would then have the same meaning. 
But why not say that the meaning of the sentence is the complex 
of flying being related by instantiation to Theaetetus? Call this version 
of S, Sx. This would avoid the former problem – ‘Theaetetus flies’ 
and ‘Theaetetus weeps’ would now have different meanings (since 
they involve the instantiation of different properties) – and we 
would have a straightforward explanation of DPC; the meanings of 
the parts of the sentence jointly build up the meaning of the sen-
tence.  
Does this proposal lead to regress? How? 
1.1 Interpretation 1: consistency demands infinite complexity  
William Lycan (2019: 4) discusses what seems to be Davidson’s ar-
gument in some detail, and gives the following reason to think that 
something like Sx leads to a regress.  
Since Sx identifies the meaning of concatenation with instantia-
tion, and use instantiation to build sentential meanings, ‘Theaetetus 
flies’ really means the same as ‘Theaetetus instantiates flying’. But 
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then consistency demands that the concatenation of ‘Theaetetus’ 
and ‘instantiates flying’ in ‘Theaetetus instantiates flying’ be assigned 
instantiation, or a similar entity, as its meaning. This entity would 
be part of the meaning of ‘Theaetetus instantiates flying’ and thus 
‘Theaetetus flies’ since the two sentences are synonymous. But this 
means that ‘Theaetetus instantiates flying’ really means the same as 
‘Theaetetus bears the instantiation-relation to flying’ or something 
similar, and so on. For every added meaning of a concatenation re-
lation, we obtain a new expression whose explicit form contains a 
new concatenation relation, which calls for another meaning addi-
tion, and so on. It thus follows from Sx that the meaning of every 
sentence is infinitely complex. And on the assumption that there are 
no entities of infinite complexity, Sx should be rejected.  
For reasons given below, it is unlikely that this is what Davidson 
had in mind, but the interpretation is nonetheless interesting. In 
particular, it is noteworthy that what is driving the regress is not any 
inability of the denoted complex itself to combine, but a require-
ment for consistency in how Sx assigns meanings. This means that 
the regress (as I have interpreted it), despite Lycan’s explicit affirma-
tion to the contrary, is not very closely related to Bradley’s regress 
(which is not framed in terms of the meaning assignments of seman-
tic theories). However, this actually makes the argument stronger, 
in one sense at least, since good solutions to Bradley’s argument (e.g. 
Maurin 2012) are not applicable to it.  
1.2 Interpretation 2: relations do not relate  
There is also a more straightforwardly Bradleyan reason to think that 
Sx leads to regress along the following lines: the entity of flying being 
related by instantiation to Theaetetus, involves a relation relating a 
person and a property, but in order to relate, all relations need fur-
ther relations to relate their relata to themselves, and these cannot 
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relate without further relations, and so on.1 So a relation cannot re-
ally relate anything, and there are no objects whose existence pre-
suppose that anything is being related. So Sx should be rejected, since 
it presupposes that there are such objects.  
This is not convincing as it stands, even if we grant that relations 
cannot relate. From what we have said so far, relations actually re-
lating anything is not an essential part of Sx. Consider Ss, according 
to which the meaning of the sentence ‘Theaetetus flies’ is the mere-
ological sum (or set, or ordered sequence, depending on one’s pref-
erence) of Theaetetus, flying and instantiation. Ss and Sx are equally 
attractive from the perspective of distinguishing the meaning of 
‘Theaetetus flies’ from the meaning of ‘Theaetetus weeps’ and from 
their account of DPC. Yet, Ss does not presuppose that there are 
relating relations. 
It might be objected though, that if it is actually impossible for 
relations to relate, there are no relations. Ss would then be no better 
off than Ss since both theories presuppose the existence of things that 
do not exist. Still, a theory which is like Ss, call it Se, except that it 
does not assign concatenation a relation as its meaning, but some 
other entity, would still have the two aforementioned benefits of Ss 
and Sx without presupposing that relations relate or even exist.  
However, the disunity of the meanings of Se might be a cause 
for concern.  
  
                                                     
1 This is regrettably crude, but will have to do for present purposes. See Maurin 
(2012) for a better version (in terms of the inability of a unifier to account for 
contingent unity within a realist framework) of a Bradleyan argument. See also 
Matti Eklund’s (2019) ‘constitution regress’ which is very similar to Maurin’s 
rendition. 
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1.3 Interpretation 3: entities cannot unite propositions 
What Davidson (1967) was really after – as indicated by Davidson’s 
2005 extended discussion of the issue – was that a theory like S (and 
Sx, Ss and Se) fails to account for the unity of the proposition ex-
pressed by an utterance of ‘Theaetetus flies’. What generates the re-
gress is that S only assigns another entity to the concatenation relation 
as a way to supplement the meanings – which are also entities – of 
‘Theaetetus’ and ‘flies’. But no mere collection of entities is going to 
account for how an utterance of a sentence can express anything, or 
how it can be true or false. New entities can be piled on top of the 
previous ones without end without ever delivering the desired ac-
count. 
This seems to be a very different argument from the Bradleyan 
argument (cf. Eklund 2019), although Davidson (2005: 105-106) 
seems to conflate the two. The desired kind of unity might obtain 
even if the conclusion of the Bradleyan argument is accepted, or per-
haps even more plausibly, might fail to obtain even if this conclusion 
is rejected. What is needed here, according to Davidson, is not the 
repudiation of metaphysical unbelievables but the incorporation of 
a special semantic role for predicates into one’s semantic theory. 
2. Davidson’s regress argument as a compositionality 
argument   
In the quoted paragraph, Davidson is engaged with rejecting a sim-
ple semantic theory, based on its inability to explain how the mean-
ing of a sentence is generated from the meanings of its parts. The 
argument is thus an instance of the more general strategy whereby 
semantic theories are evaluated by trying to establish whether or not 
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they are compatible with the principle of compositionality. This 
strategy is perhaps most famously associated with Jerry Fodor and 
Ernest Lepore (1991, 1996, 2002), who use it to show, among other 
things, that meanings (/concepts) cannot be prototypes – since the 
prototype for a complex expression, e.g. ‘pet fish’, is not derivable 
from the prototypes corresponding to ‘pet’ and ‘fish’. The strategy 
can also be seen at work in Frege’s (1892) famous rejection of the 
idea that meaning is reference, when he observes that sentential 
meanings can differ (e.g. ‘The Morningstar is the Evening star’ and 
‘The Morningstar is the Morningstar’ are not synonymous) even if 
there is lexical referential identity. And in Osherson and Smith’s 
(1982) ingenious argument against there being composition rules 
for fuzzy sets (e.g. rules that can calculate the typicality scores for 
‘round block’ and ‘round ball’ from the typicality scores for ‘round’, 
’block’, and ‘ball’). Although the general strategy has been criticized 
(cf. Jönsson 2008; Szabo 2012) it is interesting to see how the regress 
arguments described above, compares to compositionality argu-
ments like the aforementioned.  
First, it can be noted that the two first interpretations (1.1 and 
1.2) reject semantic theories based on the kind of entities that they 
presuppose exist; infinitely complex objects, and complex objects, 
respectively. The compositionality arguments rest instead on as-
sumptions about how certain entities – e.g. prototypes, referents or 
fuzzy sets – distribute over expressions, and try to demonstrate that 
the entities associated with complex expressions cannot be obtained 
from the corresponding entities associated with the parts of these 
expressions. The regress arguments are at an advantage in this regard 
since the compositionality arguments tend to presuppose specific, 
sometimes questionable, compositionality formulations that play no 
role in the regress arguments (cf. Jönsson 2008: Chapter 6). The 
second interpretation does rest on a very questionable metaphysical 
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assumption (see Maurin 2012) though, so in total it is not much 
better off. 
Second, the first regress argument depends on a methodological 
consistency requirement, which one can opt out of without aban-
doning the core idea of Sx, e.g. by maintaining that not all concate-
nation relations are meaningful, or that we should accept that an 
infinite number of concatenations are meaningful, but that all of 
these concatenations have exactly the same meaning, so the meaning 
of the sentence is not infinitely complex after all – there is just an 
infinitude of concatenation relations that all mean the same thing. 
The latter rebuttal is similar to Horwich’s (2005) suggestion that we 
can resist compositionality arguments by denying a uniformity as-
sumption according to which the meanings of words and complex 
expressions are similarly constituted. Once dropped, it seems that 
compositionality loses a lot of its bite (but see Jönsson 2008: 205). 
Dropping the consistency requirement in Sx seems even less conces-
sive which is a weakness of the first interpretation of the argument 
as compared to the compositionality arguments. 
Third, the Bradleyan argument somewhat overshoots its target 
when seen from the perspective of a compositionality argument. 
Since it establishes that there cannot be any complex wholes, there 
cannot be any sentences, and there is thus nothing that S fails to 
account for. The Bradleyan argument makes DPC redundant, and 
compositionality vacuously true.  
Fourth, from what has been remarked so far, only the third regress 
argument shows any promise as a compositionality argument. How-
ever, if we reject the Bradleyan argument (e.g. along the lines de-
scribed by Maurin 2012), it is unclear why something like Sx should 
fail to account for why an utterance of a sentence can have a truth-
value or express something (or relatedly, why e.g. Montague’s sup-
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posed insight that ‘function-argument structure [is] the basic seman-
tic glue by which meanings are combined (Partee 1997:27) is un-
dermined). When there is unity in the entities denoted by sentences, 
what else remains to be accounted for? 
Although this must be understood as preliminary conclusion, due 
to the brevity of the investigation, it seems that the regress arguments 
do not give us any information about how to best think about mean-
ing. Since I have argued elsewhere (Jönsson 2008) that neither does 
the compositionality arguments, these and the regress arguments are 
on a par in this respect.  
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Too Many Omissions, Too Much 
Causation? 
Björn Petersson 
1 
Johan did not feed your guppies when you were away, as he had 
promised. It does not seem strange to say that Johan’s omission 
caused their death. But if Johan’s not feeding the guppies caused 
their death, then arguably so did Melania Trump’s not feeding 
them, Zlatan Ibrahimovic’s not feeding them, and so on. So, if neg-
ative acts are causes, there is "far more causation in the world than 
common sense says there is" (McGrath 2005: 125).1  
To begin with, I do not find that implication too disturbing. It is 
part of common sense that on a scientific view of the world, there 
                                                     
1 The other standard worry about omissions as causes, which I do not discuss 
here, is that "[a]n omission is not like an act, a real event" (19th century thinker 
quoted in Bennett 1994: 87). Causation is supposed to be a relation between oc-
curring events, or at the very least a relation between real entities. Judith Thom-
son suggests that negative acts are states of affairs, and that causation can be a re-
lation on states of affairs (Thomson 2003: 86). Jonathan Bennett thinks that not 
doings are facts, and that causation is ultimately a relation on facts (Bennett 
1994: 87). Bruce Vermazen argues, more plausibly I think, that negative acts are 
behavioural events under negative descriptions (Vermazen 1985: 95).  
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are far more causes than the ones we can refer to in the explanations 
and predictions we make in daily life, and even that there are more 
causal influences than possibly can be included in scientific explana-
tions and predictions. There is no inconsistency in claiming that ac-
knowledging limitations of common sense, especially in this area, is 
part of common sense itself.  
Still, there is an intuitive difference between Johan’s and 
Melania’s inactions. Some attempt to show that the difference is 
metaphysical; Unlike Johan’s omission, Melania’s negative act is not 
real (Bennett 1994; Vermazen 1985) or had no effects with respect 
to your fish (Thomson 2003; McGrath 2005). Others, like James 
Woodward, think that pragmatic considerations explain our reluc-
tance to bring up Melania’s negative act (Woodward 2003: 86-91, 
226-233). I will argue that the first type of strategy fails: if Johan’s 
omission caused your fish’s death, then so did Melania’s. The prag-
matic approach is more plausible. We need pragmatics anyhow to 
explain how we bring up positively described acts in terms of causa-
tion, as well as how we talk about positive as well as negative acts in 
terms of counterfactual dependence.  
2 
According to Bruce Vermazen, “unintentional omissions, failures, 
and neglectings-to-do do not exist” (1985: 93). His main argument 
is an example in which a watchman unintentionally fails to lock a 
door twice: first because he is absorbed in reading: then because he 
is asleep. The watchman’s behaviour while reading is intentional un-
der the description ‘reading a book’. The watchman’s behaviour 
while asleep is not intentional under any description, so it is not an 
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act. But since the watchman’s behaviours with respect to the door 
are exactly similar in both cases, if his not locking is not an act in the 
second case, it was not an act in the first case either.  
However, the watchman’s sleeping and his reading are occurring 
behavioural events. Nothing stops us from referring to both events 
in negative terms, i.e. as his not locking the door. How could these 
events be brought out of existence by the mere fact that one of them 
is not intentional under any description? So, I think that the mere 
fact that Melania’s not feeding your fish was unintentional cannot 
not make it less real than Johan’s not feeding them, regardless of 
whether we call her behaviour an ‘act’. 2  
If unintentional negative acts exist, “the agent will be doing far 
too many negative acts”, according to Vermazen (1985: 96). But 
note that on the Davidsonian notion of acting that Vermazen em-
ploys, an agent performs as many positive acts as there are true pos-
itive descriptions of her behaviour, if there is at least one true de-
scription under which that behaviour is intentional. At the moment 
I am touching a keyboard, writing a sentence in English, compiling 
an open-ended list, attempting to honour Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 
50th birthday, and so on. That things are too many to be listed does 
not mean that they are too many to be real.  
Jonathan Bennett's attempt to narrow down the class of negative 
acts proceeds from the assumption that a negative proposition about 
someone's behaviour can  
                                                     
2 In some places Vermazen says more cautiously that unintentional negative acts 
“should at least not be counted as ‘acts’” (1985: 93). There is not much at stake 
in accepting that claim. ‘Negative act’ is a technical term and we could invent 
new labels for whatever it is we refer to when we speak about unintentional not 
doings. That terminological manoeuvre will not help us to cut down the num-
ber of them, though.  
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be represented by a region that covers nearly the whole space of pos-
sibilities for him at that time. That is, a proposition and its comple-
ment are positive and negative respectively if they divide the Agent's 
behaviour space /…/ extremely unevenly. (Bennett 1994: 90)  
An agent's not doing something that lies outside her space of possi-
bilities will not count as a negative act. ‘Melania did not feed your 
guppies at t’ covers all possibilities within her behaviour space at t. 
A consequence is that this phrase would not express a negative prop-
osition about Melania’s conduct — it would not state a negative fact 
in Bennett’s sense. That statement and its positive complement do 
not divide her behaviour space at all. Since Bennett regards causation 
as a relation between facts, this is a causally relevant difference be-
tween Melania’s not doing and Johan’s.  
In most contexts, the pragmatics of speech dictates that “she did 
not φ” is uttered on the background assumption the she could have 
φ-ed. But that does not make “she did not φ” false or meaningless in 
case we find out that φ-ing actually was not a possibility for her. As 
far as I can see, “she did not levitate” refers to the same kind of con-
duct regardless of whether levitation was in her behaviour space or 
not. This way of reasoning will not help us distinguish between 
Melania’s and Johan’s negative acts. 
Another line of thought is that there is something about the con-
cept of a cause that makes a difference in kind between Melania’s 
and Johan’s negative acts (Thomson 2003; McGrath 2005). Thom-
son draws the distinction in terms of being “at fault”. Johan’s nega-
tive act but not Melania’s caused the guppies’ death in virtue of the 
principle “If x is at fault for y, then x causes y.” The idea is not merely 
that x being at fault for y presupposes that x causally contributed to 
y, but that “there need not be anything that independently makes it 
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true that x caused the outcome: it can be that x's causing the out-
come follows only from x’s being at fault for it” (2003: 100). Ac-
cording to Sarah McGrath, Johan’s feeding your fish, unlike 
Melania’s, is according to the standards of promising a normal 
“would-be preventer” of their death, so his omission caused it. 
McGrath adds that “we should not be surprised to see normativity 
implicated elsewhere in causation” (2005: 146). McGrath and 
Thomson employ this strategy in non-moral contexts as well. The 
valve’s not closing can be at fault for the flooding of the basement, 
and some gland’s not secreting a certain enzyme can be at fault for a 
person’s falling ill, etc.  
Bennett presents an obvious objection to one way of understand-
ing the difference between Johan and Melania: 
[Some philosophers] count behaviour as an ‘act of omission’ only if 
it involves the agent notably not φing — usually because he ought 
to have φed. That rescues us from having to credit people with per-
forming countless acts of omissions all at once; but it makes ‘act of 
omission’ worthless in our present inquiry into the bases for our 
moral judgments on behaviour. (Bennett 1994: 88) 
The obvious objection to counting a negative act as a ‘cause’ only if 
it breaks norms is that it makes the concept of a cause worthless in 
normative reasoning about what the standards should be, and what 
counts as a fault.  
This applies to non-moral cases as well. Suppose we believe that 
the valve should close when the pressure becomes high. So, the 
valve's not closing is at fault for the flooding of the cellar. Now the 
plumber tells us that the valve’s not closing is meant to prevent leaks 
that would cause greater damage. Then, what he tells us according 
to the normative view of causation is not only that our standards 
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were wrong, but that the valve’s not closing did not cause the flood-
ing of the cellar. Moreover, the correct standards for the valve are 
based upon expectations concerning the effects of the valve's not 
closing. That sort of justification would collapse if the standards de-
termined what should be counted as effects to begin with. 
3 
Johan’s feeding your fish was in his behaviour space, his neglection 
was intentional, and he ought to have fed them. The absence of these 
elements would not, I have claimed, make a causal difference. Ad-
mittedly, it sounds weirder to say that Melania Trump’s inaction 
caused their death than that Johan’s did so. However, it also sounds 
weird to state the uncontroversial fact that if Melania had fed the 
fish, they would not have died. Regardless of what we believe about 
the conceptual relation between causation and counterfactual de-
pendence, this indicates that weirdness has little evidentiary value in 
this context. We must appeal to conversational and moral consider-
ations to explain why certain counterfactual dependencies, and also 
why certain positively described causes, are rarely brought up. So, if 
there is causation by omission, we already have a strategy that can be 
employed to explain why it sounds weirder to mention some nega-
tive acts than others.3 
                                                     
3 David Lewis makes a similar point concerning the weirdness of saying “his birth 
caused his death” (Lewis 2000: 196). In a related manner, Woodward argues 
that even when counterfactuals concerning nonserious possibilities are straight-
forwardly true, “to the extent that the possibilities that figure in them are nonse-
rious, they do not guide our causal judgments” and his notion of a ‘serious pos-
sibility’ is broadly pragmatic (2003: 90, 227).  
71 
How would this affect practical deliberation? Melania’s delibera-
tion is a matter of deciding between options that are open to her, so 
she should not worry about your guppies. What about moral respon-
sibility? Standard conditions for responsibility would require that 
the inaction was intentional, that the agent could have done other-
wise, that the effect was foreseeable, etc. Melania would not fulfil 
these conditions. 
To conclude, if we allow Johan’s omission to be a cause of your 
guppies’ death, I suspect that we cannot avoid allowing Melania’s 
negative act to be a cause of their death. This would not lead to 
practical difficulties that differ in any significant way from the ones 
we face when attempting to justify our pick of causes among actions 
positively described, or our pick of counterfactual dependencies. In 
both cases, we will have to appeal to pragmatic and moral consider-
ations.  Letting conversational and moral standards determine the 
truth of causal statements would, however, have implications that 
square more blatantly against common sense than the entailments 
that this strategy is supposed to save us from.  
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The Metaphysician as Legal Expert 
Lena Wahlberg 
1. Introduction: philosophers as expert witnesses 
In McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education 529 F. Supp. 1255 
(E.D. Ark 1982), professor of history and philosophy Michael Ruse 
was called as expert witness on behalf of the plaintiffs. The case con-
cerned the constitutionality of Act 590, which required Arkansas 
public schools to “give balanced treatment to creation-science and 
to evolution-science” (section 1), and Ruse was asked to describe to 
the court his “understanding of what science is today”. Influenced 
by Ruse’s testimony, the court found that creation science was 
“simply not science”, and that Act 590 violated the constitution. 
From a philosophical point of view, the case is interesting not only 
because of the science-theoretical problems it raised (see e.g. Laudan 
1982) but perhaps even more because it demonstrates that the ex-
pertise of a philosopher of science can make a real difference in the 
courtroom.  
However, it is extremely uncommon that a philosopher of science 
is called to serve as expert witness in court. It is probably even less 
common that a court or one of the parties appoints a metaphysician 
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as expert witness. But what if the status quo is a result of a fatal ne-
glect of the legal relevance of philosophical insights in general and 
metaphysical insights in particular? Inspired by McLean v. Arkansas, 
I will devote this paper to a discussion of the metaphysician’s 
chances of having a lucrative career as an expert witness. I will do 
this by examining the virtues of an argument from metaphysics that 
is sometimes made by legal scholars in their attempts to identify 
valid law. 
2. The argument from metaphysics (AFM) 
The average practising lawyer is not known for paying much atten-
tion to metaphysical debates. On the contrary, “law and metaphys-
ics” has been described as a “subject of limited appeal, which gains 
attention only during periods of defensiveness and self-doubt within 
the legal profession” (Yablon 1987: 616). This is so despite the fact 
that the most fundamental question for jurisprudence – What is law? 
– seems to be a metaphysical one, with immediate bearing on ques-
tions regarding what is a valid legal argument (Simmonds 2018). 
Nevertheless, practising lawyers are normally more concerned with 
whether their arguments will convince the court, than with whether 
they are consistent with the true conception of law.  
Legal scholars, however, make metaphysical arguments now and 
then, some of which are meant to have practical implications. In this 
paper, I will discuss arguments from metaphysics that have the fol-
lowing schematic form (where c is a particular conceptualisation, for 
example the current interpretation of a legal statute or term): 
 
  
75 
Premise 1 if c does not reflect the true nature of reality, then c should 
not be used in law.  
Premise 2  c does not reflect the true nature of reality. 
Conclusion  c should not be used in law.  
 
Below, I will refer to arguments from metaphysics that have this 
schematic form as AFMs. If an AFM’s first premise (below referred 
to as the “major premise”) is convincing, it would be reasonable for 
legal scholars and practitioners alike to ask metaphysicians for help 
with assessing the truth of the argument’s second premise (below 
referred to as the “minor premise”), which in turn would pave the 
way for the metaphysician as legal expert.  
3. An example from Swedish criminal law 
In this section, I will present an example of an AFM that I recently 
came across in the Swedish criminal law literature. Before presenting 
the argument, I will give a brief overview of the legal context in 
which the argument was made.  
In Swedish law, it is a notoriously difficult question to determine 
under what conditions a perpetrator’s erroneous belief shall free the 
perpetrator from criminal responsibility. In the legal literature, this 
question has been partly answered by the aid of a distinction be-
tween mistakes about the law and mistakes about factual circum-
stances. According to the principle ignorantia juris non excusat, mis-
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takes about the law do normally not free the perpetrator from crim-
inal responsibility.1 For example, a perpetrator who beats up her 
neighbour would be convicted for assault even if she did not know 
that what she did was a crime. If, in contrast, the perpetrator was 
mistaken about the factual circumstances – she thought that she was 
beating a mat and not her neighbour – she would not be convicted 
for assault, since she would lack intent to assault.  
As so often, however, the legal situation is more complicated than 
it first appears. It is generally held that mistakes about certain parts 
of the law shall free the perpetrator from liability, and hence be 
treated as mistakes about factual circumstances. For example, it is 
often claimed that a perpetrator cannot be held responsible for the 
crime “unlawful deprivation of liberty” (Penal Code (1962:700), 
chapter 4, section 2) if she erroneously believed that the law entitled 
her to deprive the victim of liberty (see e.g. Asp, Ulväng and Jareborg 
2013; Martinsson 2016; cf. my 2019). Legal scholars have tried to 
explain what, more precisely, marks the difference between relevant 
and irrelevant mistakes about the law. In older Swedish criminal law 
literature, it was common to distinguish between “legal mistakes im-
proper” [oegentlig rättsvillfarelse] (which free the perpetrator from 
responsibility for intentional offence, and hence are treated like fac-
tual mistakes) and “legal mistakes proper” [egentlig rättsvillfarelse] 
(which do not free the perpetrator from criminal responsibility) to 
explain the difference. However, the borderline between legal mis-
takes improper and proper turned out to be hard to define, and 
moreover did not quite match the perceived borderline between rel-
evant and irrelevant mistakes.  
                                                     
1 The Swedish Penal Code makes an exception for mistakes that are due to an er-
ror in the proclamation of the criminal provision or are manifestly excusable for 
some other reason (Penal Code (1962:700) chapter 24, section 9). 
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The distinction between factual mistakes, legal mistakes proper 
and legal mistakes improper received its coup de grace from Nils 
Jareborg, a Swedish professor of criminal law. In his text book 
Allmän kriminalrätt [General criminal law] (2001: 355), Jareborg 
argues that the distinction should be abandoned. One of the reasons 
he presents for not using the distinction is the following: 
[T]he distinction between “facts” and “what is prescribed by law” is 
odd. Different kinds of “institutional facts”, namely facts consti-
tuted by rules, are “real” facts too. It is as much a fact that someone 
is a prime minister as him being close-shaven.   
Although somewhat elliptical, Jareborg’s argument can be inter-
preted as an AFM, with a minor premise saying that the distinction 
in question does not reflect the true nature of reality, a conclusion 
saying that the distinction should not be used in law, and an implicit 
major premise saying that if the distinction does not reflect the true 
nature of reality, then it should not be used in law.2 In the next sec-
tion, I will discuss whether Jareborgs’ argument and other AFMs can 
be sustained. I will not examine the truth of Jareborg’s minor prem-
ise – I know of several metaphysicians who are much more suited 
than I to do this. Instead, I will discuss what it takes for the major 
premise in these arguments to be acceptable, and for metaphysical 
insights to be relevant in the first place.  
                                                     
2 In other texts, Jareborg has claimed that there is not one single true nature of re-
ality (see e.g. Jareborg 2004). However, I fail to see how his argument from 
2001 could be a meaningful criticism of the distinction if not interpreted as an 
AFM. In any case, I will make this interpretation for the sake of the argument of 
the current paper. 
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4. When is an AFM’s major premise acceptable? 
I can think of two kinds of argument that could back an AFM’s 
major premise that a particular conceptualisation c should not be 
used in law, if it does not reflect the true nature of reality:  
Backing argument A: 
Premise A1  if c does not reflect the true nature of reality, then c will not 
work in practice. 
Premise A2  if c will not work in practice, then c should not be used in 
law.  
Conclusion  if c does not reflect the true nature of reality, then c should 
not be used in law.  
Backing argument B: 
Premise B1  if c does not reflect the true nature of reality, then c is legally 
irrelevant.  
Premise B2  if c is legally irrelevant, then c should not be used in law. 
Conclusion if c does not reflect the true nature of reality, then c should 
not be used in law. 
I will now examine the soundness of arguments A and B.  
Backing argument A.  
Is it the case that if a conceptualisation does not reflect the true na-
ture of reality, then it will not work in practice? Not necessarily. As 
illustrated by, say, the continued use of Newton’s laws of motion, a 
conceptualisation can work sufficiently well under some conditions 
and for some purposes, despite not being a perfect representation of 
reality. The fact that a conceptualisation does not reflect the true 
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nature of reality can hence at most increase the risk that the concep-
tualisation will not work in practice, but few would say that this risk 
by itself means that the conceptualisation should not be used in law. 
Compare this with the pragmatic observation that that the concep-
tualisation as a matter of fact does not work satisfactorily, which 
would provide a very strong reason for not using it in law, but at the 
same time would make metaphysical information about how the 
conceptualisation relates to the true nature of reality superfluous. 
Backing argument B.  
Is it the case that if a conceptualisation does not reflect the true na-
ture of reality, then it is legally irrelevant? It could certainly be ar-
gued that some conceptualisations need to reflect the true nature of 
things in order to be legally relevant. For example, Michael Moore 
has argued that “cause” in the law “refers to a natural relation that 
holds between states and events. Because moral responsibility is tied 
to such a natural relation, and because the law is tied to morality, 
the law also is tied to this natural relation.” (Moore 2009: 5). If we 
agree with this reasoning, we could perhaps discard conceptualisa-
tions of causation that do not reflect the true nature of causation as 
legally irrelevant. But this does not mean that all conceptualisations 
that do not reflect the true nature of reality would have to be dis-
carded as legally irrelevant. For premise B1 and argument B to be 
convincing with respect to a particular conceptualisation, it must be 
explained why true nature plays a crucial role for the legal relevance of 
the conceptualisation in question. Moore’s argument about there be-
ing a link between law, morality and true causation is an example of 
an explanation which if accepted 3 would support premise B1 with 
respect to the conceptualisation of causation in the law. However, I 
                                                     
3 I regret to say that I personally am not convinced by Moore’s argument. 
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have great difficulties seeing the merits of premise B1 and of argu-
ment B in the absence of a legally convincing explanation for why a 
particular something’s true nature matters for legal relevance. 
5. Concluding remarks: the metaphysician as legal 
expert! 
If the reasoning in this paper is correct, an AFM’s major premise is 
convincing only when accompanied by an explanation for why 
something’s true nature is legally relevant. But once an explanation 
to this effect and the AFM’s major premise are accepted, metaphys-
ical insights become highly relevant to assess the truth of the AFM’s 
minor premise. And when this happens, we have very good reasons 
to invite the lawyer’s kindred spirit, the metaphysician, as legal ex-
pert. 
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Are there any Institutional Facts? 
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg 
Following John Searle, social ontologists often distinguish between 
brute and institutional facts. The fact that there is snow on Mount 
Everest is a brute fact; the fact that Donald Trump is president of 
the United States is an institutional fact. Brute facts exist inde-
pendently of any institutions; institutional facts require institutions 
to exist (Searle 1995: 2, 27; 2010: 10).  
There is an ambiguity in the notion of fact that needs to be re-
solved here. Are Searle and his followers talking about facts as 
worldly states of affairs (objects having properties, objects standing 
in relations to one another) or facts as truths, i.e. facts as true state-
ments or propositions (abstract entities)? Searle’s disciples are often 
silent on this issue. I think it is clear, however, that Searle himself 
thinks of facts – institutional ones included – as worldly states of 
affairs. He says that “facts function causally in a way that true state-
ments do not” (1995: 206) and that “the whole point of having the 
notion of ‘fact’ is to have a notion for that which stands outside the 
statement but which makes it true, or in virtue of which it is true, if 
it is true” – “[facts] are conditions in the world that satisfy the truth 
conditions expressed by statements” (1995: 211). He summarizes 
his approach to social ontology: “one […] method in philosophy is 
to analyze the structure of the facts that make our statements true. 
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In earlier chapters I have attempted to do that with the structure of 
[…] institutional facts” (1995: 221). 
But can there be worldly states of affairs that require institutions 
for their existence? How are such facts brought into being? Searle 
maintains that institutional facts are created by collectively accepted 
“Status Function Declarations”, typically of the form “We make it 
the case by Declaration that object X now has the status function Y 
in C” (2010: 99).1 Institutions are systems of Status Function Dec-
larations (2010: 10, 13). Such declarations “change the world by de-
claring that a state of affairs exist [X’s being Y] and thus bringing 
that state of affairs into existence” (2010: 12).2 The worldly state of 
affairs is created simultaneously with the performance of the decla-
ration – hence the use of the present tense and indexicals like “now” 
in declarations (Searle 1989: 556-557).   
How could a declaration synchronically bring a worldly state of 
affairs into being? By way of causation (as defended e.g. by Elder-
Vass 2012: 62-65)? That option seems to be ruled out by the special 
theory of relativity, according to which causal processes always prop-
agate at a finite velocity (precluding instantaneous causation). By 
way of grounding (as defended by Schaffer forthcoming)? But syn-
                                                     
1 A status function, according to Searle, is a function (i.e., “a cause that serves a 
purpose” (Searle 2010: 59)) with two special but interrelated features: “First, 
[…] they require collective intentionality, both for their initial creation and for 
their continued existence. And second, they are functions that a person or other 
entity has, not in virtue of physical structure […], but in virtue of collective im-
position and recognition of a status.” (Searle 2010: 59; see also 1995: 40-51; 
2010: 7, 102-104)  
2 As Searle puts it in his (1975/1979: 16): “It is the defining characteristic of this 
class [of speech acts] that the successful performance of one of its members 
brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality, 
successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to 
the world.”  
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chronic grounding in one frame of reference will, in relativistic Min-
kowski spacetime, involve backward grounding in a frame of refer-
ence moving at high velocity relative to (and towards) the reference 
frame in which the grounding relation, holding between the spatially 
separated relata, is synchronic.3 Perhaps there are instances of back-
ward grounding, but backward grounding of worldly institutional 
states of affairs is simply incredible. How could a person acquire a 
worldly property (or “status function”) of being president, a con-
victed criminal or a promoted professor before the relevant declara-
tion has occurred (in a certain reference frame)?  
Disregard relativistic considerations: synchronic creation of 
worldly institutional states of affairs by declarations is problematic 
even within a Newtonian framework, where simultaneity is absolute 
and action at a distance is possible in principle. What is the exact 
mechanism (of causation or grounding or …) that generates the 
worldly institutional state of affairs, consisting of an object with an 
institutional property, located at a distance from the declaration? It 
is hard to see how there could be such a mechanism. The idea seems 
to involve magic. As Nikk Effingham puts it, discussing declarations: 
“I think it is strange that merely speaking and intoning certain 
phrases could cause anything to exist (except, of course, for the 
words and intonations themselves). […] The thought is that only 
wizards and warlocks can bring things into existence by merely ut-
tering a few phrases.” (Effingham 2009: 253) Indeed, Searle never 
explains how worldly institutional states of affairs could be brought 
into existence by declarations. He is content proclaiming that we 
simply can bring such states of affairs into being: “We ordinary hu-
mans do not have the ability to [successfully] perform supernatural 
                                                     
3 This is illustrated in detail in my (ms.). Many of the issues mentioned briefly 
here are discussed in depth in that paper.  
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declarations [e.g., to create light by uttering “Let there be light!”], 
but we do have a quasi-magical power nonetheless of bringing about 
changes in the world through our utterances. (Searle 1989: 549) We 
can create boundaries, kings, and corporations by saying something 
equivalent to ‘Let this be a boundary!’ ‘Let the oldest son be the 
king!’ ‘Let there be a corporation!’” (2010: 100)4 
I think it is much more plausible to hold that nothing worldly is 
created by declarations (except for the words and intonations them-
selves): no worldly institutional property or object, and hence no 
worldly institutional state of affairs, is created by a “Status Function 
Declaration”. But that is not to say that collectively accepted decla-
rations do not “create” institutional facts understood as true proposi-
tions partly made true by declarations. The truth-makers for propo-
sitions such as <Donald Trump is President of the Unites States>, 
<N.N. is a convicted criminal> and <Anna-Sofia Maurin is a profes-
sor> do plausibly involve declarational utterances or inscribings (or 
more fundamentally, utterance acts (Searle 1969: 24), or Austinian 
phatic acts (Austin 1962: 95)), semantic rules, legal regulation (i.e. 
further declarational utterances and inscriptions), and people’s atti-
tudes – much the way characterized by Searle in his books and arti-
cles (Searle 1969; 1975/1979; 1989; 1995; 2010). Only, these truth-
makers seem to be brute (as Searle himself seems to acknowledge at 
                                                     
4 Admittedly, Searle says that institutional facts are “ontologically subjective” 
(1995: 8; 2010: 18), and thus it might be that he holds that they do not really 
(or objectively) exist (see also Searle 2010: 100, 120). But if institutional states 
of affairs do not really exist, how can they serve as truth-makers? How can they 
be causal? How can they be part of ontology? 
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various places, e.g. 1995: 12; 2010: 110-115). If this is correct, in-
stitutional truths5 can be taken to be made true by brute truth-mak-
ers. We need not postulate institutional state of affairs as truth-mak-
ers for institutional truths (pace Searle 1995: 221). 
To wrap up: are there any institutional facts? If understood as 
worldly institutional states of affairs (created by declarations), argua-
bly no; if understood as institutional truths (partly made true by dec-
larations), arguably yes. 
Consequence: institutional facts cannot be relata of causal rela-
tions. Qua states of affairs, they are non-existent; qua true proposi-
tions, they are too abstract. Mental representations of institutional 
facts may however influence our reasoning, decision making and be-
haviour and thereby give rise to the complex patterns of behaviour 
and social interactions we see in modern societies. (These conclu-
sions are supported further and elaborated in my forthcoming and 
ms.) 
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5 Note that we may very well allow that such truths express so-called “abundant 
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Towards a Nominalist 
Understanding of Institutions 
Johan Brännmark 
A very common understanding of institutions is that they are rules 
of some kind. For instance, an institutional economist like North 
(1990: 3) suggests that ‘[i]nstitutions are the rules of the game in a 
society’ and a social ontologist such as Gilbert (2018: 30) character-
izes an institution as ‘a system of rules that is a blueprint for human 
behavior.’ In political theory, Rawls (1999: 47-48) takes the stance 
that an institution is ‘a public system of rules which defines offices 
and positions with their right and duties, powers and immunities, 
and the like.’ What this means is that if I hold a particular status, 
such as the right to perform a specific action, the fact that I, as a 
concrete and particular individual, hold this status is explained in 
terms of a certain rule being established in my community or society. 
Typically, that rule being established is then explained by it being 
collectively accepted in some relevant way (and where explicating 
the more exact relevant way is a main focus for many social ontolo-
gists). Ultimately, such collectives do of course consist in a number 
of concrete and particular individuals, but one notable feature of the 
standard account is that in order to explain particular institutional 
facts, an abstract entity is being postulated: a rule. This standard 
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model stands in contrast, however, to another possible type of ac-
count which instead understands institutions in terms of regularities, 
with Hume’s (1978: 490) account of property being an early exam-
ple, and Lewis’ (1969) account of conventions being another. Con-
temporary versions of this kind of approach are however more com-
mon in economics than in social ontology.  
At least given a broadly nominalist starting-point, the standard 
model is prima facie unattractive. While it starts with (A) particular 
individuals holding certain attitudes and ends with (B) particular in-
dividuals holding certain deontic statuses, it goes from (A) to (B) via 
an abstract and general type of entity, rules, whose ontological status 
is often highly unclear. In this paper, it will be argued that we can 
get from (A) to (B) without this detour into the abstract and the 
general. We can do without the level of rules in accounting for in-
stitutions or institutional facts. Of course, one might not generally 
think that we should take a broadly nominalist approach to meta-
physical matters, and there is no room here for arguing that we 
should; but at the very least, given that many do find such an ap-
proach attractive, there seems to be reason to explore the possibility 
of a broadly nominalist approach to social ontology. 
1. Why consider nominalism in social ontology? 
While social ontology is arguably a species of metaphysics, the ques-
tion of nominalism is rarely discussed there. One reason for this is 
probably that the type of entities studied in social ontology tend to 
be much more complex than the ones considered in debates over 
nominalism. For instance, one important form of nominalism is 
trope theory (see Maurin 2002). Tropes are simple, particular, and 
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abstract. This then means that the kinds of objects and properties 
that we encounter in daily life are arguably not directly characteriz-
able in terms of tropes – at the very least, they are not simple, but 
have a variety of constitutive parts. Accordingly, when turning from 
fundamental metaphysics to a domain-specific metaphysics like so-
cial ontology, there is little reason to expect, even given that we be-
lieve that tropes are the ultimate building-blocks of reality, that the 
notion of tropes will be useful in identifying the building-blocks of 
social reality – the latter entities are bound to be highly complex 
complexes already to begin with. Whether we reject the existence of 
universals or not would accordingly seem to have little bearing on 
social ontology. 
There is however another main understanding of nominalism as 
well (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2015), namely as involving the rejection of 
abstract objects, and where these are typically understood as non-
spatiotemporal and causally inert objects. This sense of nominalism 
is at least at first sight more directly relevant, since the rules in ques-
tion seem to be precisely such abstract objects. While a specific com-
munity, collectively accepting or recognizing certain rules, would 
certainly be spatiotemporally located, the rules themselves are not – 
rather they make up an institution that could be collectively ac-
cepted at different times and in different places. The rules do not 
cause me to hold a particular set of rights and duties – they play a 
constitutive role instead. Here it should however be noted that social 
ontologists do not tend to explicate the more exact ontological status 
that the relevant rules are supposed to have. They could merely be 
an explanatory device that we use, presumably for pragmatic reasons, 
to facilitate our understanding of concrete institutions, but where 
the idea is not that those rules are ultimately part of what makes it 
true that I hold certain rights and duties. Given that type of ap-
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proach, perhaps social ontologists could even be quietists about ab-
stract objects, leaving it open whether the rules which are appealed 
to in order to make sense of concrete institutions are ultimately more 
than pragmatically convenient explanatory devices. 
However, at least given that one is drawn to a broadly nominalist 
approach, whether in terms of rejecting universals or rejecting ab-
stract objects or both, this kind of quietism is arguably unsatisfac-
tory. Even if fundamental metaphysics and social ontology are in 
many ways different enterprises, they are still both parts of a com-
plete account of reality, and it seems reasonable that we would prefer 
such a complete account to exhibit what might be called meta-theo-
retical congruence. For instance, unless there is any positive specific 
reason for why the list of theoretical virtues will differ between dif-
ferent species of metaphysics, the working assumption would be that 
it is the same list. Additionally, if there are certain type of explana-
tory models that we think make sense in one case, they should ceteris 
paribus make sense more generally as well – indeed, the extent to 
which a certain explanatory model makes sense in one case should 
partly depend on the extent to which it makes sense in other cases as 
well. One thing that characterizes a broadly nominalist approach is 
a commitment to what might called the primacy of the particular in 
how one seeks to explain things, i.e., even if we speak in abstract and 
general terms about certain matters, or sometimes understand par-
ticular events in term of our knowledge about certain regularities, 
the direction of explanation (in the metaphysical sense) ultimately 
runs from the level of the particular. Unless there are specific reasons 
for not doing so, the default type of explanation would be of this 
kind, not just in fundamental metaphysics, but also in areas like so-
cial ontology. To the extent that we can achieve such meta-theoret-
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ical congruence, it will arguably have bearing on fundamental met-
aphysics as well, further strengthening the case for pursuing that di-
rection of explanation there. 
2. Doing without rules 
A main reason for nominalist approaches tends to be Ockhamite, at 
least if we are already working with concrete objects: why postulate 
abstract objects unless we really have to? In the case of the standard 
model of institutions, it seems clear that the ontology in question 
already includes concrete objects, namely human individuals like 
you and me. We presumably relate to each other in a variety of ways 
and the question, then, is if we have to postulate certain abstract 
objects, rules, in order to make sense of the statuses we hold. Alt-
hough there will not be room here to develop the argument in detail 
(for more, see Brännmark 2019), this does not seem to be the case. 
To begin with, it needs to be noted that in terms of deontic sta-
tuses, we are talking here about rights and duties that have a real 
existence, not rights and duties that we should have, but ones we do 
have as a matter of social fact. Let us start with a simple example of 
how social rights and duties can be established in terms of how we 
develop certain expectations: You walk across my lawn while I am 
standing on it. I do not protest, I just say hello. You do it again. I 
do not protest, I just say hello. And then this continues. Eventually 
we are at a point where it makes sense to say that you have an infor-
mal right, mutually recognized, to walk across my lawn. If after sev-
eral years, I suddenly would protest, it would be I rather than you 
who needed to explain my behavior. The reason is that by then cer-
tain stable expectations have formed. We could of course say that 
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what has happened is that a certain rule has become established (you 
are allowed to walk across my lawn), but in order to understand the 
situation, saying this appears explanatorily redundant. All we need 
to say is that because of certain regularities being in place, certain 
expectations have been formed and gradually solidified. In fact, pos-
tulating the existence of a rule that we both accept just seems to add 
to our explanatory burden: Exactly when did we get to the point 
where the rule was established? In exactly what sense do we accept 
it? What is the exact content of the rule? 
Although a precise tracking of such mechanisms of synchronizing 
and coordinating social expectations will be more difficult on a so-
cietal level, there seems to be no principled reason against thinking 
in terms of this kind of explanatory model on that level as well. By 
looking at how we gradually adjust our expectations on each other, 
and how we come to synchronize and coordinate these expectations 
so that enough people hold similar expectations, certain regularities 
might be established. For instance, an institution like the family 
clearly involves a range of expectations on what individuals occupy-
ing certain roles should or should not do, and where by a massive 
amount of interactions stretching far back in time, we as individuals 
have gradually modified our expectations into a state where we are, 
at least on the whole, relatively synchronized and coordinated even 
on a societal level. Now, if we understand our statuses as flowing 
from certain rules we would presumably think that, say, being a fa-
ther or being a mother comes with certain rights and duties and that 
these are then, ceteris paribus, the same for all fathers and all mothers. 
On the alternative nominalist approach, however, the main relation 
obtaining between the statuses that we hold as individuals will be 
similarity or resemblance, not sameness. It can make sense to speak 
of what is typically involved in being a father or being a mother, but 
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ultimately different fathers and mothers will have somewhat differ-
ent rights and duties, in terms of the social expectations that they 
face, depending on their more exact concrete circumstances. The de-
ontic statuses that they hold come from below rather than from 
above, so to speak. 
One consequence of adopting this kind of approach would be that 
it becomes natural to understand institutions as temporally extended 
complex concrete objects. Identity over time will not be about how 
the same set of rules are instantiated at a series of different time-
points, but about continuity and connectedness throughout this 
temporally extended object. In fact, to the extent that we were to 
generalize rules from the patterns of expectations that obtain at dif-
ferent time points, these rules could, and probably would, be differ-
ent at different times. Such differences would however then be about 
that particular institution being differently shaped at different times, 
not about a series of different institutions (qua systems of rules) con-
secutively being in place. Exploring this consequence in more detail, 
however, is something that will have to be left for another occasion. 
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Will Science and Proven Experience 
Converge or Diverge?  
The Ontological Considerations. 
Johannes Persson 
Hans Larsson (1862-1944) is perhaps our most well-known Lund 
philosopher. He was a prolific writer, and the author of philosophi-
cal monographs, essays and also novels. He became professor of the-
oretical philosophy in Lund in 1901 and member of the Swedish 
Academy in 1925. Two of his research interests make him a natural 
starting point for this essay. First, he believed that there is reason 
and logic in experience and intuition, and that this gives experience 
and intuition a role not only in decision-making in ordinary life, but 
also in science and philosophy (Larsson 1899). Second, he became 
interested in the balance between the convergence and divergence of 
philosophical ideas (Larsson 1924). The philosopher as an individ-
ual often seeks divergence, he thought, but philosophical ideas tend 
to converge as they are worked out in depth and detail (Larsson 
1944: 84-87). He supported his convergence thesis with a number 
of examples from the history of philosophy but he also accepted the 
general hypothesis that the convergence of principles follows from 
the ambition to see them universally applied (Larsson 1924: 217). 
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Larsson’s claim was not that fully worked out philosophical ideas 
converge completely – a small but important “netto divergence” 
might remain and prolong their difference: 
Den handlar för resten om ’konvergens och divergens’ och ensamt 
det säger tydligt nog ifrån att jag icke önskar divergensen förbisedd. 
Den är enligt min uppfattning tvilling till konvergensen. Jag finner 
denna då jag söker göra mig reda för vad som verkligen skiljer, di-
vergensnettot, så att säga. Innan man kommer fram till det, får 
mycket av den gängse uppfattningens brutto dragas ifrån. Men 
denna sista divergens får aldrig utplånas. Mellan Mills välfärdslära 
och Kants pliktlära är bruttoskillnaden väldig. Men när man ser att 
Mill räknar rättvisan som en av de viktigaste välfärdsposterna, kom-
mer välfärdsberäkningen oftast (jag tror alltid) att till resultatet sam-
manfalla med pliktbudet […] (Larsson 1944: 85) 
Larsson’s convergence idea is intuitive. It belongs to a family of such 
ideas, of which C. S. Peirce’s version might be the most well-known: 
But human opinion tends in the long run to a definite form, which 
is the truth. […] There is, then, to every question a true answer, a 
final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly 
gravitating. (Peirce 1871/1992: 89) 
It may be that the motivations behind some of the convergence ideas 
presented in the literature differ, and that this is true of Peirce and 
Larsson. In Larsson’s case, there is ample room, it seems, for differ-
ent kinds of negotiating processes of the kind that can be used by 
advocates of two or more philosophical or (indeed) political ideas. 
The mechanism behind convergence and divergence might be com-
petition, or it may be more peaceful interaction between viewpoints 
aiming at explaining as many as possible of the appearances:  
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Idéerna, dem skall man aldrig försona! Säger Oswald Spengler; de 
skola föra sin kamp till slut, så världen gå trött och bruten ut ur vår 
tids blodströmmar. Men då är det nog falska idéer det är fråga om; 
icke genomtänkta och mognade, alltför partiella för att med rätta 
kallas idéer (Spengler tänker på den tyska och engelska anden), ännu 
ej inställda under det universella förnuftskravet. (Larsson 1924: 
208) 
Here I propose to stick with Larsson’s convergence-with-a-possible-
netto-divergence idea, and to apply it to two systems of ideas or ex-
periences—systems distinguished by their form, or perhaps the 
knowledge generating mechanisms they rely on, rather than the con-
tent of the ideas or experiences they contain.  
In Sweden, the notion of ‘science and proven experience’ has fea-
tured in the regulation of healthcare for more than a century. In 
1890, the Swedish king, Oscar II, issued a Royal Decree explicitly 
obliging a physician to “deliver such counsel, and, as far as circum-
stances permit, to extend such therapeutic endeavours, to every pa-
tient under his care as are necessitated by the patient’s condition and 
as are consonant with science and proven experience” (Pontin 
1891). Today, the Patient Act (2014:821, ch. 1, p. 7) states that 
patients shall be given medical care that is consonant with science 
and proven experience, and the Patient Safety Act (2010:659, ch. 6, 
pp.1-2) makes it clear that healthcare workers have a personal duty 
to perform their work in accordance with this standard. 
Most of us would say that we know, roughly at least, what one of 
the conjuncts in science and proven experience is. The nature of sci-
entific knowledge has of course been debated, and in these debates 
different features of what we count as science have been in focus at 
different times. Deductive proof used to be regarded as a hallmark 
of science, and so did certainty. At other times, scientific method 
and fallibility have been seen as more salient. Nowadays, the concept 
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of systematicity seems especially important (e.g. see ALLEA 2017). 
But at one point, at least, the idea that science is grounded in obser-
vation was equally influential. 
However, the nature of the other conjunct—proven experience—
is something we are less certain about. Clearly, proven experience 
has something to do with experience. Without experience it is im-
possible. We can add three further observations. (1) Someone can 
act in accordance with proven experience with no experience of his 
or her own of that of which there is proven experience. (2) Proven 
experience is often a particular kind of experience of a measure or 
treatment—namely, that it works. (3) Proven experience is generally 
well tried, in the sense that the belief or practice it validates is often 
put to the test repeatedly. 
Science and proven experience are sources of evidence, and are 
treated as such (Persson et al. 2017). Sometimes only one of the two 
is present to a significant degree. Small-scale farming, in particular—
one of the most common forms of employment in the world—is still 
based largely on knowledge acquired through practical experience 
(Altieri 2004; Akullo et al. 2007), and some of the most sustainable 
farming systems in the world are entirely based on knowledge and 
practices acquired through the practical experience of generations of 
farmers, the so-called Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Sys-
tems (GIAHS). Sometimes one of them is marginalized, politically 
and ideologically (Hountondji 2002). 
Similarly, thrombus removal following ischaemic stroke involves 
removing the clot mechanically. The usual procedure is to try to dis-
solve the clot using drugs, but if the clot is a big one this is not always 
successful. In advance of scientific support, or clinical trials, special-
ized centres have tried to remove larger clots mechanically. The re-
sults have been good, and consensus as to the effectiveness of the 
technique has emerged. Here we have a case where medical decisions 
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are based on proven experience for a considerable time, until science 
catches up and corroborates the experience (e.g. Persson et al. 2018; 
Wallin et al. forthcoming).   
Many of our interventions in the public sector—whether in 
health care, or social work, or primary or secondary education—are 
required to be consonant with both science and proven experience. 
But is this requirement only instrumentally, and perhaps temporar-
ily, motivated by the fact that sometimes our most reliable 
knowledge comes in the form of proven experience while sometimes 
it emerges as scientific knowledge. Larsson’s assumption would pre-
sumably be that eventually, provided enough work is put into sci-
ence and proven experience, the two will become similar—partially 
identical, perhaps. Would they overlap completely? Or could there 
be a substantial netto divergence? 
A straightforward—and too plain?—objection to Larsson’s and 
Peirce’s convergence thinking is that we may never reach conver-
gence for the simple reason that we start asking different questions. 
If person A starts asking question Q1 and person B starts asking Q2, 
where is the guarantee that they will end up with the same beliefs or 
experiences? 
There is no such guarantee, of course. The multitude of academic 
subjects, some of them with a very long history, testifies to this fact. 
Topic incommensurability (Hacking 1983) might be the result. 
This objection applies in a more interesting way to Larsson than it 
does to Pierce. Peirce, as we have seen, sometimes frames the con-
vergence claim relative to a specific question, effectively excluding 
scenarios where A and B ask different questions. Larsson comes at 
the issues from a different angle, but on the other hand, he seems to 
restrict his discussion to philosophical system builders—who, it 
might be assumed, should deliver answers to every significant phil-
osophical question. 
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There may be room for a connected complaint. The order of 
questions and answers can affect the result, or epistemic destination, 
considerably (e.g. Farber 2005). If we start with Q1, we are likely to 
understand it, and answer it, differently from the way we would do 
so if we were to approach it after dealing with Q2. Popper’s 
P1>TT>EE>P2 schema is relevant here. Popper (1963) observes 
that, as a rule, error-elimination (EE) applied to a tentative theory 
(TT) leads to the emergence of a new problem (P2 as compared with 
P1).  
These subtleties aside, it is certainly possible that questions raised 
from the scientific and the proven experience perspective are bound 
to develop along different trajectories.  
Consider Larsson’s conviction that the ambition of philosophical 
ideas is to be universally applicable. Not everyone would wholly 
agree. Baruch Fischhoff (2018) has argued that the philosopher’s 
ambition is moderate in this respect, while the sciences are more am-
bitious. However this theoretical difference is settled, Fischhoff pro-
vides support, in effect, for the view that science is likely to develop 
its questions in accordance with the ambition that the tentative the-
ories should be universally applied. 
Things appear to be different when it comes to proven experience. 
Even if the ambition might in one sense be the same, namely to have 
proven experience of everything relevant, there is little to be said for 
the idea that proven experience should be formulated in such a way 
that it is always the same proven experience we rely on. 
The unsought effect of such a strategy might even be that a third 
category–local knowledge–relating the abstract and universally war-
ranted experience to the real cases, at the different hospitals, would 
have to be introduced and put alongside science and proven experi-
ence. 
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There is perhaps an ontological formulation of what has just been 
said. A theme has emerged in the VBE group working with Nils-
Eric Sahlin:  
Let us assume that proven experience is experience. Experience is 
in many ways similar to belief. It, too, has representational content. 
The idea of proven experience signals that it can be more or less 
uncertain, more or less robust. In addition, however, experience has 
a certain character. And it might be that proven experience has an 
additional character. It is, we may assume, unclear what these char-
acters are. They might, for instance, be of the kind discussed in Leon 
(1987). 
Proven experience can be shared. As mentioned earlier those with-
out experience of their own of, say, the success of treatment X, can 
still reliably act on that experience. Given this, we cannot assume 
that the character of proven experience is always manifest as a phys-
ical token in each individual sharing it. But the token might still 
exist somewhere. Perhaps that is a condition of the proven experi-
ence’s existence. 
Something similar could have been accepted as true of scientific 
knowledge, especially if those who argued that scientific claims were 
only shorthand for more complicated claims about observations had 
been right. But it seems that they were not. 
Hence there might be an ontological difference explaining why 
there will always be a netto divergence between science and proven 
experience. 
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The Ontology of Decision-Making 
Nils-Eric Sahlin 
We make many decisions each day. Some of them are rational, some 
irrational. Some we are entertained by, some we wish we’d never 
made … Most of them we will never remember, still less how we 
came to make them. We need help – or don’t we? But shouldn’t 
there be one and only one guide to rational action? A cacophony of 
competing theories may be slightly bewildering. How do we choose 
between them? 
In his seminal paper “Subjective expected utility: A review of nor-
mative theories” Fishburn (1981) discusses the “primitives, axioms 
and representation-uniqueness theorems” of miscellaneous theories 
of rational decision-making. One reason for the large number of the-
ories is what Fishburn describes as the interplay between realistic de-
cision structures and structural axioms that help us derive the desired 
theorems. Another reason is of course the “primitives”. The struc-
ture of the different types of entity varies from one theory to the 
next, and so do the relations among these entities. In other words, 
the ontological assumptions we make matter. 
Asked what a decision is, most of us would say that it is a choice 
of one alternative over a set of other, possible alternatives, and that 
what determines the choice is decision maker’s beliefs and desires. 
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More often than not we do not have control over the factors deter-
mining the consequences of our choices. Those consequences are 
determined by the way the world unfolds, by what turns out to be 
the true state of the world. Already we have something that looks 
like an embryonic ontology. We have acts, consequences and worlds. 
Fumbling onwards, we are outlining an ontology of decision-mak-
ing. A well-designed ontology of decision-making will, we hope, 
make it easier to structure real-life decision problems while also mak-
ing it evident how and when to apply the decision tools available. A 
rough-hewn or excessively proof-driven design, on the other hand, 
will be very likely to lead to something more or less inapplicable. 
Ramsey’s quintessential decision ontology contains consequences 
– worlds, he calls them – and propositions. Acts are constructed out 
of worlds and propositions. Ramsey’s theory is, as Fishburn so ele-
gantly puts it, “extremely rich, insightful, and very carefully rea-
soned”. Among the primitives there is, of course, also a preference 
relation over worlds and acts. Ontologically, this relation is far more 
important than one might think. If not only consequences (worlds), 
but also propositions and acts consort with values, things quickly 
become messy. Ramsey saw this. His first axiom is an ontological 
axiom stating that there is an ethically neutral proposition believed 
to degree a half – a device designed to avoid the problem of propo-
sition-dependent preferences. 
Savage’s ontology is in many respects similar to Ramsey’s. His 
(1972: 9) decision ontology consists of the world, i.e. “the object 
about which the person [decision maker] is concerned”; states of the 
world, each being “a description of the world, leaving no relevant 
aspect undescribed”, and true states, each of which is “the state that 
does in fact obtain, i.e., the true description of the world”. An event 
is simply a set of states. An innovation in Savage’s ontology is that 
acts are identified with their consequences. An act, as he puts it, is 
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“a function attaching consequences to each state of the world” (Sav-
age 1972: 14) and it is assumed that there is a preference relation on 
this set of acts. 
As already said, there are many theories of decision-making under 
uncertainty, all differing in various ways from the others. They as-
sume different types of entity and postulate the existence of different 
types of relation between entities. Entities are not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity, we are told. Ontological parsimony is a virtue: an 
ontology inhabited by just tropes, facts or particulars is preferable to 
more abundant world views. 
Why, for example, spend time constructing facts out of universals 
and particulars, if everything turns out better if we do it the other 
way around? Why assume entities and recombine them if they were 
never separated in the first place? Why get into a jam looking for a 
glue, or endless number of different glues, if such adhesives were not 
needed in the first place? If tropes are all we need, things will in 
many ways be far less complicated. (See, e.g. Maurin and Sahlin 
2005) 
Decision theoreticians, too, have tried to streamline their ontolo-
gies. Jeffrey (1965) is one of them. Do we really need worlds, prop-
ositions, events, consequences and acts? Can propositions do the job 
on their own? The answer is Yes, but that a thin ontology comes at 
a price. The ontology of Jeffrey’s theory is so meagre that it is hard, 
if not impossible, to apply it, or to recognise in it a real-world deci-
sion problem. The very idea of what a decision is may be lost if the 
ontology is too streamlined. Ramsey’s theory has an applied ontol-
ogy that is carefully thought through, and therefore it does the work 
it should do. However, the question is whether Ramsey’s decision 
ontology is also undernourished. 
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Years ago (Sahlin 1991), I criticised decision scientists for being 
too empirical. Empirical research can be too empirical. My com-
plaint was that Rational Man (theories of rational decision-making) 
was not the best point of departure if we want to model, or under-
stand, human decision-making. What I didn’t appreciate at the time 
was that even if you take-off in the wrong direction and with a com-
pletely unrealistic map in your hand, you may after all end up in the 
right place. Today we can clearly see that some of the research done 
on human decision-making has given us invaluable knowledge. 
Psychology, a good friend of mine says, is the study of abnormal 
behaviour. Aberrant behaviour illuminates the normal. Of course, 
we also have a desire to help people with psychological and psychi-
atric problems. But if the norm is Rational Man, we will all deviate 
from the norm – we are all abnormal. I stick to my old guns and 
maintain that theories of human decision-making need well-de-
signed applied ontologies. This was not how I expressed myself at 
the time, but today I see that it is what it was all about. For example, 
clearly, we have to say what a belief is – what a value is. We must 
design an ontology that is rich enough, hangs together and applies 
to the problems we want to solve. The classical normative theories 
do not give us such an ontology. The “primitives” are important, 
propositions, events, acts, consequences, worlds … So are the rela-
tions among these entities. But somewhere there must be an agent – 
a Homo economicus or sapiens, with beliefs and values, information 
and preferences – taking a decision. What is a belief? What is a value? 
However we answer these two questions we have to design, or re-
design, our decision ontology accordingly. 
If we lack theories of belief and value, it will be difficult to explain 
human decision-making in depth. To make the case for this, I made 
use of three distinct conceptions of what it is to believe (1991). First, 
a mentalistic theory on which beliefs are mental acts. In Hume’s 
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words: a belief “may be most accurately defin'd, a lively idea related 
to or associated with a present impression” (A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Book I, Part II, Section VII). Second, a dispositional theory 
of belief on which “I believe that p” means that I entertain p and 
have a disposition to act as if p were true. Third, beliefs as mental 
states, or as Ramsey puts it: “a belief ... is a map of neighbouring 
space by which we steer” (Ramsey 1929/1990: 46). We believe p if 
p is on our mental map. These views on what a belief is limit the 
options, the ways in which decision behaviour can be interpreted 
(explained and understood). If it is only by establishing a lively idea 
in a decision maker’s mind that we can understand and explain de-
cisions, we have to design our experiments accordingly. Equating 
belief with behavioural consequences, on the other hand, we risk be-
ing unable to explain people’s behaviour through their beliefs and 
desires. And a map view of beliefs delivers explanatory power but at 
the same time requires empirical studies to be designed and carried 
out in the framework of that particular theory, which might be very 
difficult. 
The point here is simple: the theory of belief we adopt – repre-
sentationalism, dispositionalism, interpretationism, functionalism, 
eliminativism or instrumentalism (see Schwitzgebel 2015) – inevita-
bly influences our interpretation of empirical results. I now see that 
this criticism can, with equal force, be directed against normative 
theories and their ontologies. However, this time it is a question not 
of explainability but applicability that is the focus. The theories of 
rational decision-making, however mathematically beautiful, are so 
meagre from an ontological point of view that it is hard to apply 
them in any real-life situation. 
Schwitzgebel (2015) puts his finger on a particular but very im-
portant problem when he writes: “However, the phrase ‘degree of 
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belief’ may be misleading, because the relationship between confi-
dence, betting behavior, and belief is not straightforward. The dis-
positionalist or interpretationist may regard exhibitions of confi-
dence and attitudes toward risk as only part of the overall pattern 
underwriting belief ascription. Similarly, the representationalist may 
hold that readiness to deploy a representation in belief-like ways 
need not line up perfectly with betting behavior.” With a thin on-
tology, the type of ontology a mathematician likes, we do not even 
notice that this is a problem. We have what we need to prove the 
desired representation theorems, and that is what we wanted to do 
in the first place. But with a thick, more applied type of ontology, 
the problems suddenly appear, and we note that they are both inter-
esting and intricate. 
Shaffer (2009) has argued that Bayesian “decision-theoretic char-
acterizations of decision situations fail to adequately account for 
knowledge concerning the causal connections between acts, states, 
and outcomes in decision situations”. This, he says, makes them in-
complete, and the problem is fundamentally an ontological one. 
This is a much-discussed issue, and one that shows how important 
it is to take ontological questions seriously before indulging in math-
ematics. In a forthcoming paper Fischhoff (2019) discusses the in-
terplay between bounded rationality, satisficing and risk-taking. He 
is not upfront discussing any ontological questions, but what is said 
in the paper still pinpoints the need for good applied ontologies in 
the area of risk-taking. A good example of the way in which re-think-
ing the ontology of decision-making and risk can produce a more 
capable theory is to be found in Weirich’s forthcoming book Ra-
tional Responses to Risks. But there is far more to be done. 
Ontologists have taught us how important applied ontologies are 
– e.g. ontologies of medicine, and of institutions, and of law, war 
and crime. I hope these scattered thoughts of mine may inspire 
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someone, ideally an eminent metaphysician, to study the ontology 
of decision-making with greater care. In the end, that will provide 
us with better tools for wise decision-making. 
References 
Maurin, A.-S. and Sahlin, N.-E. (2005) Some Ontological Speculations: Ramsey 
on Universals, Particulars and Facts, Metaphysica 3(3), 7-28. 
Fishburn, P. C. (1981) Subjective Expected Utility: A Review of Normative The-
ories, Theory and Decision 13, 139-199. 
Fischhoff, B. (2019) The Microbiomes of Gut-Level Decisions, forthcoming in 
Critical Quarterly.  
Jeffrey, R. C. (1965) The Logic of Decision, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1929/1990) Truth and Probability. In Mellor, D. H. (ed.), Philo-
sophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ramsey, F. P. (1929/1990) General Propositions and Causality. In Mellor, D. H. 
(ed.), Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sahlin, N.-E. (1991) Baconian Inductivism in Research on Human Decision 
Making, Theory & Psychology 4(1), 431-450. 
Savage, L. J. (1972) The Foundations of Statistics, second revised edition, New 
York: Dover Publications. 
Schwitzgebel, E. (Summer 2015 Edition) Belief. In Zalta E. N. (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/ar-
chives/sum2015/entries/belief/>. 
Schaffer, M. J. (2009), Decision Theory, Intelligent Planning and Counterfactu-
als, Minds & Machines 19, 61–92.  
Weirich, P. (forthcoming) Rational Responses to Risks, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
  
114 
  
115 
How Cellular Automata Dissolve 
the Fine-Tuning Argument 
Einar Duenger Bohn 
I have always found the so-called fine-tuning argument to be among 
the more rationally respectable and interesting arguments in favor of 
the existence of a god, or more precisely, in favor of the existence of 
a supernatural intention behind the universe.1 I once mentioned this 
to Anna-Sofia, that I was somewhat impressed by the fine-tuning 
argument. She gave me the incredulous stare. She was not impressed, 
neither by the argument nor by me.  
Her incredulous stare made me think again. I now suspect she was 
right. So, in her honor, I will in what follows show how work in 
computer science on so-called cellular automata in fact dissolves the 
fine-tuning argument. 
  
                                                     
1 See Bohn (2016).  
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The fine-tuning argument: where it ends up 
Roughly, here is what I used to consider a plausible version of the 
fine-tuning argument (FTA). The fundamental physical laws, con-
stants and ratios are extremely fine-tuned for physical life (or, per-
haps even better, for consciousness) in the sense that each one of 
them has one out of extremely many possible values, and pretty 
much the one value each one of them in fact has is the only value 
among extremely many possible values they could have had in order 
for there to be physical life as we know it, anywhere in the universe.2  
The question is: Why is the one and only possible universe with 
life also the one and only actual universe shining bright with exist-
ence? In other words, why isn’t the actual universe without life, given 
that it is much more likely? This cries out for an explanation, and 
there are three leading contenders. First, it is due to chance; shit 
happens, and life happens. Call this the chance hypothesis. Second, 
it is due to the fact that all possible universes are actual universes; 
and no wonder we could not be in a universe we could not be in. 
Call this the multiverse hypothesis. Third, it is due to there being an 
intention behind it all; there is a god after all. Call this the god hy-
pothesis. By a common principle of evidential favoring employed 
not only in the heart of the hard sciences, but throughout all of ra-
tional reasoning, whichever one of the three hypotheses makes the 
fine-tuning most likely is also the hypothesis most supported by the 
evidence.  
As an explanation of the fine-tuning, each one of the three hy-
potheses has its own pros and cons, but for present purposes we need 
                                                     
2 Strictly speaking, there is probably a small range of values compatible with life, 
but the range is so small compared to all possible values that for all practical pur-
poses we can think of it as a single value for each law, constant and ratio.   
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not even choose between them because the argument is blocked be-
fore we even get that far. We need to ask: What is it that cries out 
for an explanation? Obviously, it is not the mere fact that the phys-
ical laws, constants and ratios have the values they do that cries out 
for an explanation, but the fact that those actually existing values are 
the only ones that can support life. Ultimately, it is the extreme un-
likelihood, but still actuality of life that cries out for an explanation. 
In other words, ultimately it is the fact that there is actually life in 
contrast to non-life that really cries out for an explanation. So, ulti-
mately, the question becomes: why does life as such cry out for an 
explanation?  
If life cries out for an explanation, neither the chance hypothesis 
nor the multiverse hypothesis will explain it; if life doesn’t cry out 
for an explanation, the god hypothesis is neither here nor there. Also, 
none of us knows what it really means for something to cry out for 
an explanation. Why do some things cry out for an explanation, but 
others not? This is where I think the debate over the fine-tuning 
argument ends up without much more to say to move it forward 
other than simply that life is an amazing and mind-blowing thing 
that we feel we should explain. The problem is that some feel it, but 
others don’t. In short, some feel life needs an explanation, but others 
don’t. None of us knows why we have that feeling, nor what could 
justify such a feeling.  
Cellular automata: how work in computer science 
dissolves the argument 
First, consider a plane of white squares, infinite in all directions. Sec-
ond, pick an arbitrary square on the plane, paint it black, and move 
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to the row below it. Third, consider various very simple algorithms 
(if-then rules) telling you which squares to paint black on a row, 
given how the black and white squares are arranged on the row above 
it. Fourth, follow the various simple algorithms where they lead, at 
least for several thousand steps, preferably millions, or even billions.  
Such constructions are known as cellular automata.3 The better 
our computers get, the greater such cellular automata we can realize 
and study the result of, which has been done in computer science 
for many years already. What shocks everyone who starts studying 
cellular automata is that, on the basis of one black square (with the 
rest being white), very simple algorithms with very small differences 
between them in fact leads to very complex patterns with very big 
differences between them. What’s more, some of the patterns look 
completely random and chaotic, others boringly repetitive, but oth-
ers beautifully organized throughout, while yet others look orga-
nized in some of its areas but not throughout. What’s even more, if 
you zoom in on a pattern, it might look nothing special, but if you 
zoom out, you’ll see the most beautiful or artsy pattern you have ever 
seen.4  
And that is just with two colors: black and white. If you add grey, 
not to mention all other colors, it will most definitely blow your 
mind. And we can only begin to imagine the results of cellular au-
tomata in four or eleven dimensions, even on the basis of a simple 
handful of properties.   
What’s most important for present purposes though is that for 
some of these patterns, if you saw it on a rock you found on the 
beach, you would think nothing special of it, it would be like en-
                                                     
3 See e.g. Wolfram (2002) for an ambitious, punchy and fun introduction.  
4 See e.g. Adamatzky & Martinez (2016) for some artsy patterns.  
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countering any other rock on the beach, but for others of these pat-
terns, you would think there was something special about it, seeing 
it on a rock would be like encountering a watch on the beach. You 
would think it cried out for an explanation: Whence that beautiful 
and amazing pattern?! It cannot be random!  
But the sober fact we have learned from work on cellular autom-
ata in computer science over the last couple of decades is that it all 
arises from simple and boring algorithms on e.g. the basis of a black 
square among a bunch of white squares. Such a simple and boring 
algorithm gives you the pattern you think nothing special of, but an 
almost identical simple and boring algorithm also gives you the pat-
tern you think something special of. So, you believe there is an im-
portant difference, but you’re wrong. As a matter of fact, there is no 
important difference between the two patterns, for any sense of ‘im-
portant’ you might here care about.  
But then at least I start suspecting that the exact same thing might 
be going on in the case of life (or consciousness). We think nothing 
special of the patterns of universes with no life, but some of us think 
something special of the patterns of universes with life. Some thus 
believe there is an important difference. But given what we now 
know from work on cellular automata in computer science, we 
should suspect, in fact hypothesize that those who believe there is an 
important difference here are just wrong. We should hypothesize 
that, as a matter of fact, there is ultimately no important difference 
between the two patterns. They both are the result of the same kind 
of simple and boring algorithms, based on the same simple and bor-
ing handful of dimensions and properties. At least we should no 
longer trust our own sense of which patterns are special, or in need 
of an explanation, because we are, as a matter of fact, often wrong 
elsewhere. Work on cellular automata thus empirically show that the 
distinction between what we think cries out for an explanation and 
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what we think don’t cry out for an explanation is often all in our 
heads. Given that I know this is the case with respect to cellular au-
tomata, I cannot conclude that it is not the case with respect to life. 
For all I know, it is all just patterns arising from a handful of prop-
erties and a completely uninteresting algorithmic process. At least 
that is the simplest and most empirically informed hypothesis.  
Conclusion 
The fine-tuning argument thus leads to neither the chance hypoth-
esis, nor the multiverse hypothesis, nor the god hypothesis. Rather, 
the very heart of the fine-tuning argument dissolves before we 
should conclude anything, and it dissolves from considering cellular 
automata: they empirically show us that there is no good reason to 
believe that life (or consciousness) is special, even though some of us 
feel it is. Life’s algorithm might very well be as simple and boring as 
any other, even though its result seem to us very exciting, in need of 
an explanation. The study of cellular automata show that we cannot 
in any way trust our own sense of some patterns being special, or in 
need of an explanation.  
So I now think that Anna-Sofia’s incredulous stare was justified. 
The fine-tuning argument gives us no good reason to conclude from 
the fact that we find life (or consciousness) in need of an explanation 
that it in fact needs an explanation compared to non-life (or non-
consciousness). The fine-tuning argument might tell us something 
interesting about our psychology, but it does not take us closer to 
the existence of a supernatural intention behind our universe.  
121 
Acknowledgement 
Thanks to Atle Ottesen Søvik for comments. 
References 
Adamatzky, A. & Martinez, G.J. (eds.) (2016). Designing Beauty: The Art of Cellu-
lar Automata, Springer.  
Bohn, E.D. (2016). Why this Universe? In Asle Eikrem & Atle Ottesen Søvik 
(eds.) Thinking Seriously about God, LIT Verlag, 2016.  
Wolfram, S. (2002). A New Kind of Science. Wolfram Media Inc.  
122 
  
123 
What is Field’s Epistemological 
Objection to Platonism? 
Ylwa Sjölin Wirling 
1. Introduction 
This paper concerns an epistemological objection against mathemat-
ical platonism, due to Hartry Field (1989). Platonism is a view ac-
cording to which mathematical truths are about mind- and lan-
guage-independent, abstract, and acausal entities. The argument 
poses an explanatory challenge – the challenge to explain the reliability 
of our mathematical beliefs – which the platonist, it’s argued, cannot 
meet. Is the objection compelling? Philosophers disagree, but they 
also disagree on (and are sometimes very unclear about) how the 
objection should be understood. Here I distinguish some options, 
and highlight some gaps that need to be filled in on the potentially 
most compelling version of the argument. 
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2. Two characteristics 
Here are two characteristics (C1 and C2) that any good reading of 
Field’s objection should have.  
It’s commonly agreed that Field’s argument constitutes an im-
provement on Paul Benacerraf’s (1973) influential dilemma for pla-
tonists, primarily because it doesn’t rely on any particular theory of 
knowledge. Benacerraf’s dilemma (BD) can be stated as follows: pla-
tonism is our best theory of mathematical truth, seeing that it pre-
serves our strong conviction that mathematical truths are objective 
and mind-independent, but platonism is incompatible with the 
claim that we have mathematical knowledge, seeing that our best 
theory of knowledge has it that knowledge requires a causal depend-
ence of beliefs on the relevant facts. Read as an epistemological ob-
jection against platonism, the upshot is that assuming platonism, 
mathematical knowledge is impossible. This relies on the outdated 
causal theory of knowledge, which makes it uncompelling. But BD 
does point to something interesting, according to Field, namely the 
puzzling question of how our mathematical beliefs can be so accurate 
if they are about platonic objects (1989: 25-26). Field shows that 
this can be posed as a problem for the platonist without appeal to 
any particular theory of knowledge. He proceeds from the assump-
tion that our mathematical beliefs are largely true. That is, our meth-
ods for supporting mathematical beliefs are reliable with respect to 
finding out about the mathematical facts.1 Such reliability must be 
explained. This explanatory challenge is at the heart of Field’s objec-
tion (FO), and the point is that assuming platonism, it cannot be 
                                                     
1 Schechter (2010: 441-443) has pointed to the importance of focusing on the re-
liability of the method rather than the reliability of the beliefs.  
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met.2 Thus, FO should be independent of any particular theory of 
mathematical knowledge (C1).  
Second, FO is distinct from two standard nominalist arguments 
against platonism (C2). Platonist often claim that mathematical ob-
jects are indispensable to our best scientific explanations, and there-
fore we are justified in postulating their existence (see e.g. Colyvan 
2001; Baker 2005, 2009). One common nominalist argument seeks 
to establish that this indispensability claim is false. It’s well-known 
that Field gives such an argument elsewhere (1980), but FO is sup-
posed to be a distinct objection against platonism. Another common 
nominalist strategy attacks the indispensability project more gener-
ally, i.e. questions the Quinean idea that we are justified in postulat-
ing the existence of an entity x if x is indispensable (see e.g. Maddy 
1992; Melia 2000; Leng 2002; and Finn 2017). But Field clearly 
accepts indispensability as ontological justification, so FO should be 
compatible with that general idea. 
In sum, FO should not rely on the correctness of any particular 
theory of mathematical knowledge, and the argument should be rel-
evant even assuming that there is an indispensability argument sup-
porting the claim that mathematical objects exist. Is there a compel-
ling version of such an argument?3 
  
                                                     
2 Notably, the problem is not that platonists haven’t actually provided an explana-
tion, but that it seems they couldn’t, even in principle. 
3 I want to stress that my aim here is not exegetical, i.e. not to pin down the argu-
ment Field actually had in mind, but to find the most compelling version of the 
argument given certain constraints that arguably distinguish Field’s general ap-
proach here from other arguments in the same ballpark. 
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3. Two readings, in light of C1 
The conclusion of FO is that the reliability of our mathematical be-
liefs, like the belief that 2+2=4, cannot be explained, given plato-
nism. There is no doubt that this is supposed to “lower philosophers’ 
confidence” in platonism, as Liggins (2018) puts it. But why is it bad 
for platonism if this reliability is unexplainable? There are at least 
two possible answers here, which can be presented as two readings 
of the following passage by Field:  
The idea is that if it appears in principle impossible to explain this [the 
reliability of our mathematical beliefs], then that tends to undermine 
the belief in mathematical entities, whatever reason we might have 
for believing in them (1989: 25-26, emphasis in original). 
First, we may read it as saying that if reliability is unexplainable then 
our mathematical justification, for beliefs like 2+2=4, is under-
mined. This reading gives us what I call the sceptical version of 
Field’s objection, SFO for short. It can be constructed as follows: 
a If it seems in principle impossible to explain the reliability of our 
mathematical beliefs, then any prima facie justification we have 
for our mathematical beliefs is undermined.  
b Assuming platonism, it seems in principle impossible to explain 
the reliability of our mathematical beliefs.  
c Assuming platonism, our mathematical beliefs are not justified. 
(a, b) 
In a nutshell, unexplainable reliability implies mathematical scepti-
cism, and that’s why we should reject platonism if SFO is sound. 
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The sceptical reading is endorsed by e.g. Baras (2017); Burgess and 
Rosen (2005); Clarke-Doane (2017); Pust (2004); and Rosen 
(2001). 
On another, less popular but more literal, reading, what is under-
mined (“the belief in mathematical entities”) is an ontological belief, 
about the existence of the entities postulated by the platonist. This 
makes a difference: not being justified in claiming that 2+2=4 is one 
thing, not being justified in claiming that platonic numbers exist is 
quite another. We may thus construct the objection as follows:  
d If it seems in principle impossible to explain the reliability of our 
mathematical beliefs given some theory T, then the ontological 
postulates of T should be rejected.  
e Assuming platonism, it appears in principle impossible to explain 
the reliability of our mathematical beliefs. 
f Platonic mathematical objects should be rejected (d, e).  
I’ll call this the ontological version of Field’s objection, OFO for 
short. In a nutshell, we should reject platonism because its core on-
tological claim – that there are platonic mathematical objects – 
should be rejected. Something like this reading is endorsed by Lig-
gins (2006; 2010; and 2018).  
The two readings differ importantly, in light of C1. Both readings 
are independent of any particular theory of mathematical knowledge, 
but SFO very centrally rests on a claim about the necessary condi-
tions of justified mathematical belief, since it ties the badness of ren-
dering reliability unexplainable to the undermining of justification 
for mathematical beliefs. Clarke-Doane (2017: 20), willingly 
acknowledges this: 
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According to Field, if one’s beliefs from a domain F are justified 
then it does not appear to her in principle impossible to explain the 
reliability of her F-beliefs. 
This is expressed in the argument by a. But insofar as justification is 
a necessary condition for knowledge, this also involves a substantial 
assumption about the conditions of mathematical knowledge. To be 
sure, it’s not considered as implausible an assumption as the causal 
theory of knowledge assumed by BD. Nevertheless, there is about as 
little in the way of consensus when it comes to theories of justifica-
tion as there is when it comes to theories of knowledge. OFO, in 
contrast, does not make any assumptions about what is required for 
knowledge or justification of mathematical beliefs. Nor does it make 
any assumptions about whether our mathematical beliefs actually 
amount to either knowledge or justified belief. It only has it that 
they are reliably true (whatever else that might entail, epistemically 
speaking) and that this must be explained. 
OFO thus seems preferable if the aim is to have an objection in-
dependent of theories of knowledge. It’s potentially more compel-
ling than SFO, since the platonist won’t be able to reject it on the 
basis of not subscribing to any particular epistemological theory. 
Now, it might well seem an odd ambition for an epistemological 
objection to be independent of any epistemologically substantial as-
sumptions, so C1 itself could perhaps be questioned. But even then, 
SFO has problems. It has been argued at length by e.g. Baras (2017), 
Burgess and Rosen (2005) and Clarke-Doane (2017), who all as-
sume SFO to be the correct reading, that the epistemological argu-
ment against platonism is uncompelling because premise a is false.  
For the moment then, OFO seems to be the most promising version.  
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4. Defeating ontological justification 
But for OFO to present a compelling case against platonism, some 
gaps must be filled in. Most obviously perhaps: what does unexplain-
able reliability have to do with ontological justification (or lack 
thereof)? Differently put, why should one accept d? There is no good 
answer in the literature to date. Liggins just says that the lack of re-
liability explanation is an embarrassment for platonism because the 
reliability of our mathematical beliefs is “the sort of phenomenon 
which demands explanation”. Field himself similarly stresses that it’s 
bad because it forces the platonist to regard this reliability of ours as 
a brute fact (1989: 238), which is highly unpalatable. Granted, it’s 
perfectly legitimate to regard some facts as brute, but this reliability-
fact just isn’t one of them. But how, or why, should we take this to 
impact the question of ontological justification? 
Now, recall that the most common, and most forceful, reason to 
believe in the existence of platonic objects comes from an indispen-
sability argument. And by C2, the point of FO can’t be that platonic 
objects are not indispensable. The point must be that even if they 
are, this does not justify the claim that they exist. Platonism’s com-
mitment to the bruteness of a fact which appears to demand an ex-
planation, is thus supposedly some form of defeater for the justifica-
tion from indispensability.  
It’s common to distinguish between rebutting and undercutting 
defeaters for some claim that p. A rebutting defeater for p, is a reason 
to believe not-p. An undercutting defeater for p is a reason to think 
that one’s original justification for p is not sufficiently indicative of 
the truth of p. Either the commitment to a brute fact can be pitched 
as a rebutting defeater, i.e. as a reason to think that platonic objects 
do not exist. Or, it can be pitched as an undermining defeater, i.e. as 
a reason to think that the apparent justification for the claim that 
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platonic objects exist isn’t sufficiently indicative of the truth of this 
claim. In particular, OFO either gives a reason to reject the existence 
of platonic objects to be weighed against the reason to affirm their 
existence, afforded by an indispensability argument. Or, it gives us 
a reason to think that their indispensability isn’t, after all, sufficiently 
indicative of their existence – it breaks the link between the conclu-
sion of a valid indispensability argument and the platonic existence 
claim.  
Both of these options are interesting, but badly in need of further 
elaboration. Consider first the rebutting strategy, according to which 
the principled absence of a reliability explanation is a reason to reject 
the existence of platonic objects. Is this plausible? Is it the job of an 
entity to enable us to explain how we come to have reliable beliefs 
about it? Undoubtedly, it’s intellectually frustrating if our reliability 
turns out to be a brute fact, and in some sense unintuitive. But is 
that really a reason to doubt the existence of the entities that seem-
ingly put us in this situation? Moreover, for OFO to be a real threat 
to platonism, it must be a pretty strong reason, if it is to compete 
head-to-head with the positive reason afforded by an indispensabil-
ity argument. Because remember that in light of C2, the objection 
should be independent of whether mathematical objects are indis-
pensable. 
Consider next the undercutting strategy. It needs to be specified 
how commitment to brute reliability can break the link between in-
dispensability and existence. Since, again by C2, the point with FO 
isn’t a wholesale attack on indispensability arguments, the wielder of 
this strategy would presumably be saying something like this: indis-
pensability of xs is only a reason to assume the existence of xs under 
certain circumstances, and the commitment to a brute reliability fact 
suggests that these circumstances are not at hand in the case of pla-
tonic objects vis-à-vis our best scientific explanations. But what are 
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the relevant circumstance, and why should we doubt that they ob-
tain when reliability turns out to be a brute fact?  
In sum, on either way to pitch OFO there are a number of as-
sumptions about ontological justification and how certain explana-
tory tasks play into such issues, which must be spelled out and then 
assessed, before it can be decided whether there is a compelling ver-
sion of Field’s epistemological objection to platonism. 
5. Conclusions 
Is there a compelling version of Field’s epistemological objection to 
platonism? Assuming we want an argument free of substantial epis-
temological assumptions, the most compelling reading of the objec-
tion has it targeting the justification for the existence claim at the 
heart of platonism. However, challenges lie in wait for someone 
wishing to pursue this version of the argument. I distinguish be-
tween two ways to pitch it: as a rebutting defeater and as an under-
cutting defeater for the justification afforded by an indispensability 
argument. In either guise, the objection raises multiple questions 
concerning ontological justification, especially in light of how Field’s 
objection is supposed to relate to other arguments in the literature. 
Assuming the objection is uncompelling on the sceptical reading 
(seeing that it rests on substantial assumptions about mathematical 
justification, the tenability of which have been questioned else-
where), whether there is a compelling version of Field’s epistemolog-
ical objection thus depends on the tenability of certain assumptions 
about ontological justification that are yet to be spelled out. Doing 
so is further work awaiting anyone wishing to argue that unexplain-
able reliability defeats the platonist’s ontological justification. 
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Reflections on Metaphysical 
Explanation 
Rögnvaldur D. Ingthorsson 
The nature of metaphysical explanation is a question that should be 
constantly on every metaphysician’s mind, and yet it is rare to see 
explicit statements about the methodological approach that writers 
take. We tend to just enter the flow of ideas and words in a particular 
‘discourse’ and see where it leads us. It is easier that way but can lead 
us astray. I can’t claim to be a role-model in this respect. I have of-
fered a comment here, a remark there, but plenty room for improve-
ment. However, I have come across quite a few confusions that can 
be traced to failed understanding of method/approach, and one or 
two really interesting statements of method. Here I share one such 
confusion about method, and one interesting view about method. 
1. A confusion about Hobbes 
The necessity of causal connections is usually associated with causal 
realism. Say, Aristotle’s claim that “whenever the potential active 
and potentially affected items are associated in conditions propitious 
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to the potentiality, the former must necessarily act and the latter 
must of necessity be affected” (Metaphysics: Bk. 9, §5). For Aristotle, 
this is not the result of an a priori argument outlining a logical/con-
ceptual necessity, but a consequence of a certain view of material 
reality; objects with powers interact to provoke changes in each 
other. I have always supposed that this was the view Hume targeted 
(Treatise: Bk. I, Part 3). 
However, in Elizabeth Anscombe’s famous discussion of causal 
necessity, we see Hobbes being represented as Hume’s target and as 
someone who ‘evidently’ sees causal necessity as a “logical connec-
tion of some sort” (Anscombe 1971: 89). To be sure, Hobbes does 
incriminate himself in the following passage:  
[…] an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the 
agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; 
which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be under-
stood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and if any 
one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect 
is not produced (Hobbes 1656: Ch. X, §3)  
However, I think Anscombe is wrong to infer from Hobbes’ use of 
the phrase ‘cannot be understood’ that he is developing a purely log-
ical argument, at least not of the a priori kind. 
Hobbes’ epistemology is empiricist, albeit with clear rationalist 
overtones. He thinks the senses provide us with empirical knowledge 
about the powers of material bodies, and thus knowledge of causes, 
because powers are causes (Hobbes 1656: Ch. I, §4). From our em-
pirical knowledge of these causes we can then rationally calculate the 
effects they produce, and, vice versa, the causes from the effects. In 
light of this, I think it would be more charitable to interpret Hobbes 
as making claims about what can/cannot be thought, given the na-
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ture of the external world as it is empirically known to us (or as-
sumed). This could offer a basis for a deductively valid argument, 
yes, but using premises with material (non-logical) content which is 
empirically true; hence the conclusion is a posteriori of experience. If 
we find fault with his claims about what can or cannot be under-
stood, we should find fault with his empirical knowledge and not 
with his logic. 
Consider the same reasoning in the early 18th century, from some-
one with knowledge of Newton’s Principia. That person could argue 
like Hobbes that—if Newtonian mechanics is accepted as a true de-
scription of the world—it cannot be understood, on pain of contra-
dicting Newton’s mechanics, but that if an object is acted upon by 
an external force it will change its state of motion in proportion to 
the force applied. It is a logically valid argument, but moving from 
premises based on empirical research, and so the conclusion is a pos-
teriori. The approach suits a naturalist approach to metaphysical ex-
planation.  
Indeed, Naomi Thompson (2019) outlines something very simi-
lar. On her view, metaphysical explanations are subject to epistemic 
constraints imposed by the context in which a question is asked; they 
are not explanations of what must be the case without regards to any 
concerns except what can or cannot be conceptualised.  
Hume may well have had Hobbes in mind. But he didn’t just 
attack his logic. Hume first had to deny Hobbes’ premise that the 
senses give us knowledge of the nature of external objects, and thus 
turned the question of causation into a mere conceivability issue; 
one unrestrained by epistemic concerns (Treatise: Bk. I, Part 3).  
Now, it is difficult to assess today in what way exactly it can have 
mattered that Anscombe misrepresented Hobbes’ position. But we 
can tell that it did matter. 
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2. McTaggart’s approach to metaphysics 
McTaggart’s The Nature of Existence (1921/1927), is well known for 
containing McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time. It is less 
well known for containing a long and very interesting elaboration of 
metaphysical method. Indeed, he devotes the whole of chapter 3, 
‘Method’, to an elucidation of his approach. Contemporary readers 
may be even more surprised to find out that we can find something 
useful about metaphysical explanation in the writing of a self-con-
fessed Hegelian idealist.  
It is important to note that McTaggart is an idealist in two differ-
ent ways. First, he is an idealist with respect to the method of meta-
physics; a methodological idealist. He thinks we can only gain 
knowledge about the ultimate structure of reality—which is the aim 
of metaphysics—through an examination of the general content of 
our ideas; not through a study of the content of our experiences of 
particular matters of fact. Empirical observations are inadequate to 
the task because they are particular both with regard to the qualities 
observed and the identity of the entities observed, while the ultimate 
structure of reality will have to be perfectly general. We might be 
able to infer by abstraction from a number of particular observations 
that they have some general feature in common, but this would fail 
to show that this general feature belongs to more than just the lim-
ited sample we have observed. Instead, McTaggart believes (we may 
be tempted to downgrade this to hopes) that the rational mind is able 
to directly ‘grasp’ the general nature of the fundamental features of 
reality via rational reflection of the ideas we have about them. In 
other words, his preferred method of finding out about the ultimate 
structure of reality is by introspective reflection on the general con-
tent of our minds.  
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Today it is popular to ridicule idealism as a silly idea from the 
past, but in actuality much of contemporary metaphysics cannot re-
ally be distinguished from idealism. Whenever anyone focuses solely 
on the conceptual connections between ideas in their philosophy, 
which is the essence of a priori philosophical reasoning, they are do-
ing pretty much what the idealists thought philosophy is all about. 
Indeed, anyone who thinks that the theories and findings of empir-
ical science is irrelevant to metaphysics because it can only tell us 
about the actual world—just one manifestation of all the possible 
worlds allowed by the ultimate structure of reality—are applying a 
method I find difficult to distinguish from McTaggart’s.   
Second, McTaggart is an idealist with respect to the nature of re-
ality; an ontological idealist. This is perhaps the aspects of idealism 
that tends to be ridiculed. He thinks he can show that reality cannot 
fundamentally be material, and that therefore reality must instead 
consist of spiritual substance (ideas). His argument for this conclu-
sion is pretty much identical to Berkeley’s, notably that we are mis-
takenly inferring from the fact that we are acquainted with phenom-
enal properties in experience, that there must be something non-
phenomenal that is causing the experience. Now, we may not want 
to accept this argument as proof of the conclusion that there is no 
material reality outside the mind. But, I think we should pay atten-
tion to the importance McTaggart bestows on subjective experience, 
as a way to judge the success of metaphysical theories. I think it holds 
good for idealists and material realists alike. 
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3. Taking experience seriously  
According to McTaggart, the way things appear to be in experience 
does not give us knowledge about what things are really like. Even 
an idealist can distinguish what ideal reality appears to be like and 
what it is really like. He nevertheless thinks that the content of our 
experience provides an important criterion for the success of meta-
physical theories. A metaphysical theory need not portray reality as 
it appears to be in experience. Indeed, such a theory is often trying 
to say what things are really like, as opposed to what they appear to 
be like. However, since the content of experience constitutes a rare 
type of certain and indubitable knowledge—what Russell called 
‘knowledge by acquaintance’, notably of our own inner states—
every adequate metaphysical theory must be able to explain how the 
experiences we actually have can arise. If it says the world is not as it 
appears to be, it must be able to explain how it can appear to be 
otherwise  
To calm the jitters of hardcore realists, let’s be clear about the 
limits of knowledge by acquaintance. It is a form of knowledge that 
doesn’t extend beyond the content of the experience itself. My ex-
perience of an apple on a table indubitably constitutes knowledge of 
the state of my mind, notably that I am having an experience of that 
kind. But, it does not constitute knowledge of whether there is in 
reality an apple on the table. However, since the former is indubita-
ble knowledge, our account of reality must take into account the fact 
that reality contains my experience of an apple on a table.  
McTaggart’s idea, roughly, is that any theory about what things 
are really like can be tested by asking whether it offers a conceptual 
model of reality that explains why things actually appear to us in the 
way that they do. The model need not resemble the appearance, but 
if it differs from the appearance it must explain what it is about the 
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world that allows it to appear so different from what it really is. As 
long as the model cannot explain the characteristics of experience, 
the facts of experience constitute an anomaly for the theory. On the 
other hand, when we have a model that claims the world is different 
from experience, yet is able to explain how it can appear in the way 
that it does, the appearance becomes a phenomenon bene fundatum; 
a well-founded datum of experience (McTaggart 1927: §494).  
I think we can observe that many of the core disputes in meta-
physics revolve around the question of how well theories explain ex-
perience. For instance, presentism is meant to have the upper hand 
on eternalism in explaining why we only ever experience the present. 
Not just because presentism says the world is pretty much as it ap-
pears to be, but more because eternalism cannot adequately explain 
how we can have a continuous experience of successive states and of 
ourselves as continuously remaining in the present, when in fact 
nothing exists continuously through time or moves from one time 
to another. For all its other faults, McTaggart’s philosophy has one 
piece of good advice; take experience seriously as a criterion of suc-
cess for metaphysical explanations. 
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Ramsey and Alien Structure* 
Matti Eklund 
We tend to think of the world – or the structurally most basic facts 
about the world – as involving objects, properties and relations (or, 
if you like, particulars and universals). When something is the case, 
that is a matter of how things stand with these objects and proper-
ties.  There is much disagreement about what objects and properties 
there are, and there is disagreement about the nature of objects and 
properties in the first place. But there is widespread agreement re-
garding the general structure of the world: the world consists of ob-
jects, properties, relations, etc. and when something is the case it is 
a matter of how things stand with these entities the world consists 
of. 
The agreement is widespread, not universal. Some theorists do 
not believe in such entities as properties or relations. Others don’t 
believe in objects but think that what are normally regarded as ob-
jects are merely bundles of properties. However, these renegades all 
depart from orthodoxy only by eliminating something from the or-
thodox picture. 
                                                     
* Anna-Sofia Maurin is a deeply appreciated philosophical friend and colleague. It 
is a privilege to honor her through contributing to this Festschrift. 
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But might the world have positively alien structure, with features 
not found in the familiar picture? Might the world in some sense 
contain alien elements, not found in the familiar picture? These alien 
elements would either be alien entities in addition to familiar ones, 
or modes of combination of entities different from what we are oth-
erwise familiar with. The question I am attempting to raise is admit-
tedly vague, with the vagueness being due in part to vagueness in 
what counts as familiar, but some of the vagueness is hopefully rem-
edied in the discussion to follow. 
Here is an intuitive motivation for exploring the possibility of al-
ien structure seriously. The picture of simple facts as consisting of 
objects and properties mirrors the subject-predicate structure of sim-
ple sentences. And it may be suspected that when we think of the 
world the way we do, we are simply naively mistaking what is a fea-
ture of our languages for a feature of the world. Maybe there are 
other languages, with different structure, which we could use to de-
scribe the world. Or, if we are somehow psychologically constrained 
to use representational systems with familiar semantic structure: 
maybe other creatures could use other languages, with different 
structure, to successfully describe the world. And there may be no 
reason for thinking that familiar languages better capture the world’s 
structure than do these other possible languages. 
Return now to the “familiar”. We can think of familiar structure 
as structure corresponding to the structure of ordinary linguistic rep-
resentations, and alien structure as corresponding to alien kinds of 
linguistic representations. This does not do away with unclarity in 
“familiar”, for the explanation relies on a distinction between alien 
and familiar kinds of representations, but it still helps illustrate what 
the intended target is. In the below, an alien language is a language 
employing alien kinds of representations:  expressions of alien cate-
gories, or alien modes of composition. 
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These issues mentioned are big issues, and the ideas I have just 
briefly described certainly stand in need of elucidation before they 
can even be sensibly discussed. My aim in this brief note is much 
more modest. In his celebrated article “Universals” (Ramsey 1925), 
F.P. Ramsey famously questioned the particular-universal distinc-
tion. What I will consider here are some relations between on the 
one hand the themes and theses introduced by Ramsey and on the 
other alien structure. I will simply bring up some considerations that 
come up in connection with Ramsey’s text, and note how they relate 
or not to the possibility of alien structure in the sense above indi-
cated.1 
Let me begin by providing some relevant background. One main 
argument in “Universals” is this. Two sentences with different struc-
ture – Ramsey’s examples are “Socrates is wise”, and “Wisdom is a 
characteristic of Socrates” – can, in Ramsey’s words, “assert the same 
fact and express the same proposition” (404). In each sentence a sub-
ject can be distinguished, but since the sentences have different subject-
predicate structure, one cannot infer anything about the subject-predicate 
structure of the proposition they both express by considering the sen-
tences. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that in a “sufficiently elastic lan-
guage”, any propositions that can be expressed by a sentence of that lan-
guage can be expressed with “any of its terms” as subject (ibid.). Ramsey 
concludes, “Hence there is no essential distinction between the sub-
ject of a proposition and its predicate, and no fundamental classifi-
cation of objects can be based upon such a distinction” (ibid.). The 
kind of distinction Ramsey has in mind is exemplified by, e.g., the 
idea that particulars are exactly the entities which can only occur as 
                                                     
1 In the below, all references are to Ramsey (1925). 
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subjects in propositions, whereas universals can occur both as sub-
jects and as predicates. (In the article, Ramsey associates this specific 
view with Johnson (403).) 
For Ramsey, the most promising way to explicate the particu-
lar/universal distinction would be in terms of what entities can play 
what roles in propositions. He insists that disputes concerning the 
particular/universal distinction have to do with the “logical nature” 
of entities (402, 404, 405). But by arguments like that presented, he 
is skeptical at least about one way of distinguishing between entities 
on the basis of their logical nature: distinguishing between them on 
the basis of their ability to occur as subjects and as predicates in 
propositions. 
I say “he is skeptical”. Towards the end of the article, Ramsey 
pretty clearly gives voice to a general agnosticism. He says that “we 
know and can know nothing about the forms of atomic proposi-
tions”, and that “[o]f all philosophers Wittgenstein alone has seen 
through the muddle and declared that about the forms of atomic 
propositions we can know nothing whatever” (417).  However, the 
conclusion of the argument we have been concerned with is the more 
definite “there is no essential distinction between the subject of a 
proposition and its predicate, and no fundamental classification of 
objects can be based upon such a distinction” (404). There is noth-
ing ‘agnostic’ or cautious about this. Now, Ramsey doesn’t say here 
that there is no particular/universal distinction, but that claim follows 
if we assume that if there is such a distinction then it must be possible 
to discern subjects and predicates in at least some propositions.  One 
way of making Ramsey consistent is by interpreting him as making a cat-
egorical negative claim – there is no subject/predicate structure in propo-
sitions – but at the same time allowing that there is some other way in 
which entities can play broadly speaking different logical roles in proposi-
tions. Maybe entities play different logical roles in propositions, but in a 
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way that does not correspond to how expressions play different semantic 
roles in sentences of familiar kinds of languages. If there is any kind of 
language at all whose sentences mirror the structure of propositions, that 
language would have to be an alien language. Of course, even before look-
ing at details, one can worry that the strategy behind Ramsey’s argument 
against a subject/predicate generalize to other distinctions between differ-
ent logical roles in propositions.  And if sentences of an alien language ex-
press the same propositions as sentences of a more familiar kind of lan-
guage, then one can make the Ramsey-style point that we cannot deter-
mine whether the propositions have familiar or alien structure. 
Whatever Ramsey’s conclusions are exactly, he is in one way phil-
osophically radical: he challenges the time-honored particular-uni-
versal distinction. (Nominalists, denying the existence of universals, 
in a sense deny it too, by denying the existence of universals. But 
even the nominalist would agree that all putative entities can be clas-
sified as particulars or universals.) But even so, there is another way 
in which he is not radical. He does not challenge the idea that reality 
consists of the entities we otherwise take it to consist of. He does not 
challenge the existence of familiar entities like Socrates and wisdom; 
nor does he introduce alien entities in addition to the familiar ones. 
He only challenges the idea that the entities there are can be reason-
ably divided up into particulars and universals, given the way “par-
ticular” and “universal” are properly understood. But a more radical 
skepticism suggested by Ramsey’s arguments would be that the en-
tities that are the real constituents of propositions are not familiar 
entities like Socrates and wisdom and are not in any straightforward 
way named by any expression of the familiar sentences we use to 
express them. 
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In the concluding section of the article, Ramsey says, 
In conclusion let us describe from this new point of view the proce-
dure of the mathematical logician. He [sic] takes any type of objects 
whatever as the subject of his reasoning, and calls them individuals, 
meaning by that simply that he has chosen this type to reason about, 
though he might equally well have chosen any other type and called 
them individuals. The results of replacing names of these individu-
als in pro-positions by variables he then calls functions, irrespective 
of whether the constant part of the function is a name or an incom-
plete symbol, because this does not make any difference to the class 
which the function defines. (417) 
(Where Ramsey here uses “object” I would use “entity”, in order 
better to emphasize that the remarks do not specifically concern par-
ticulars but concern any entities whatsoever.) 
Ramsey’s “mathematical logician” is agnostic about the logical 
structure of reality. He holds that there are no distinctions in reality 
(of a “logical nature”) to be concerned about between different 
broadly speaking logical categories of entities, for we cannot know 
what these possible distinctions are. All that we need to be concerned 
about is that there are sentences, some of them containing names - 
and any type of entity can be named – and the sort of thing that 
results from replacing a name by a variable, the “incomplete sym-
bols” referred to. The strategy of Ramsey’s mathematical logician is 
reasonable independently of any supposed further structure in real-
ity and the question of whether reality might “really” contain alien 
structure is moot. The important thing is just that reality lends itself 
to the kind of representation the mathematical logician prefers. 
This general broadly instrumentalist view, as we may call it, in turn 
comes in different flavors. It can be used for conservative purposes. 
It can in principle be used to criticize attention to alien structure: 
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the claim would be that anything can in this way be described in 
familiar terms, and hence we need not concern ourselves with alien 
structure. On the other hand, the friend of alien structure can say in 
response to this that there is still the question of whether it is also 
possible to say things using a language with different, alien kinds of 
expressions; and whether such an alien language might serve useful 
purposes. Even if any entity whatsoever can be named and picked 
out as subject of reasoning and even if one can use representations 
of a familiar kind in the way Ramsey’s ‘mathematical logician’ does, 
one can raise questions of whether one can also devise alien kinds of 
representations for various theoretical purposes. If instrumentalism 
is right, then the usefulness of these representations would not indi-
cate that reality has alien structure – the latter question is rejected – 
but for the same reason, the usefulness of familiar representations 
does not indicate that reality has familiar structure. 
A possible view slightly different from the agnostic instrumental-
ist view mentioned is one which positively insists that there are no 
logical distinctions in reality to track. There are differences between 
how expressions occur in sentences, and that is that. The same re-
marks that applied to the instrumentalist view as first described ap-
ply also to this variant. 
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On Hyperintensional Metaphysics 
Darragh Byrne & Naomi Thompson 
A certain kind of realism about various rather theoretical phenomena 
has been gaining traction lately in metaphysics. One strand in Anna-
Sofia’s recent work resists one instance of this (though we note that 
plenty of other strands in her work pull the other way!). This is her 
(2019) critique of a certain unionist realist conception of metaphys-
ical grounding. Advocates of this position (e.g. Raven 2012; and 
Rosen 2010) hold that grounding is explanatory by nature and thus 
that grounding inherits its properties from those of explanation, and 
yet also that grounding is an objective, worldly matter. Anna-Sofia 
argues that this combination of doctrines is unstable, because our 
familiar conception of explanation is mind-involving. 
Daniel Nolan (2014) defends a position suggestive of an espe-
cially abstract, general instance of this topical realism: a kind of over-
arching realism about a whole family of theoretical phenomena. No-
lan’s focus is hyperintensionality, an especially abstract property that 
is (sometimes somewhat mysteriously) attributed to myriad meta-
physical phenomena, e.g. properties, essence, intrinsicality, and 
again, grounding. Nolan’s central contentions are, first, that we need 
hyperintensional notions to describe and explain important aspects 
of the world, and second, that this need cannot be accounted for in 
terms of ‘features of our representational systems’ (2014: 150). He 
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does not explicitly describe his position as ‘realism about hyperin-
tensionality’, but his remarks are supportive of it (and in conversa-
tion, he’s sympathetic). We worry that this realism about hyperin-
tensionality exhibits an instability similar to that which Anna-Sofia 
diagnoses in the particular instance of realist unionism about 
grounding, in that it threatens to conflate a metaphysical feature 
with the way in which it is represented.  Thus in criticising Nolan’s 
argument below and defending the view that hyperintensionality de-
rives from features of our representational system, we take ourselves 
to be siding with Anna-Sofia, even though our position is much 
more general than hers.  
Hyperintensionality 
The reason that attributions of hyperintensionality to metaphysical 
phenomena sometimes seem mysterious is that in the first instance 
at least, hyperintensionality is, like intensionality, a feature of repre-
sentations: its bearers are positions in sentences. A position in a sen-
tence is intensional if substituting co-referential/co-extensive occu-
pants of that position can change the truth value of the sentence. In 
 
(1) Alex hopes that Anna-Sofia will write another paper 
the position occupied by ‘Anna-Sofia’ is intensional because it may 
be possible to change the truth value of (1) by replacing ‘Anna-Sofia’ 
in it with a co-referential term, e.g., ‘the author of the Stanford En-
cyclopaedia entry on tropes’. The position occupied by ‘Anna-Sofia’ 
in (1) is also hyperintensional because we can change the truth value 
of the sentence by replacing the name with e.g. ‘Professor Maurin’, 
a term that is not only co-referential, but necessarily so in the sense 
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that ‘Anna-Sofia is Professor Maurin’ is not only true, but (in con-
trast to ‘Anna-Sofia is the author of the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry 
on tropes’) necessarily so.  
We accept Nolan’s first contention: hyperintensional locutions 
are needed to describe and explain the world. But we defend the 
doctrine that his second contention rejects: that hyperintensionality 
derives from features of representations. We defend this doctrine, 
which we label ‘conceptualism’, by adopting a broadly Fregean con-
ception of representation. 
A Fregean perspective 
According to Fregeans, words don’t refer directly to objects, proper-
ties and states-of-affairs: rather, speakers refer by associating words 
with their conceptions of these subject-matters – the senses of words 
and sentences – and these are what people express or mean when they 
speak and think. If Alex associates a certain conception of a person 
with the name ‘Anna-Sofia’, but not with the description, ‘The au-
thor of the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry on tropes’, then what he 
says/thinks when he utters/entertains the sentence, ‘Anna-Sofia will 
write another paper’ is distinct from what he would say/think were 
he to utter/entertain ‘The author of the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry 
on tropes will write another paper’. We can think of Alex’s hopes 
(and his beliefs etc.) as relations he bears to the senses expressed by 
sentences like these, so that as expected, (1) may be true even if the 
sentence we get by replacing the first of these terms in it with the 
second is false.  
Should we regard this conception of the intensionality of (1) as 
realist or anti-realist? On the one hand, the account trades crucially 
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on the fact that there are two distinct ways of thinking about a single 
thing, so it seems to suggest that the intensionality of (1) results from 
features of ways of representing the world. So the Fregean position 
is a version of conceptualism – the position whose hyperintensional 
analogue Nolan opposes. On the other hand we’re a little reluctant 
to label the position ‘anti-realist’, since on the Fregean view, senses 
are not ethereal, subjective or psychological. Senses are objective rep-
resentational perspectives: they do not spring from the representa-
tional activities of particular human thinkers. 
Next note the ease with which this account of the intensionality 
of sentences like (1) may be extended to deliver an account of their 
hyperintensionality. Fregeans allow that terms which necessarily co-
refer (in the sense explained above) can differ in sense just as terms 
which only contingently co-refer can, and wherever such differences 
arise it will be possible to formulate sentences whose truth values are 
sensitive to suitable substitutions. The key ingredient in this expla-
nation of (1)’s hyperintensionality – and what makes it conceptualist 
– is the same as in the explanation we offered of its intensionality: 
it’s the notion of Fregean sense.  
Nolan’s argument 
Nolan does not consider the conceptualist position offered above, 
but he would not be impressed by the example in terms of which we 
explained it, because his key move is to argue that hyperintensional 
notions are needed to describe and explain non-representational fea-
tures of the world. Intentional states like Alex’s hopes are representa-
tional phenomena so Nolan would say it’s no surprise that we can 
explain their hyperintensionality in representational, conceptualist 
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terms. Nolan offers several examples of non-representational phe-
nomena of whose hyperintensionality he thinks we should not ex-
pect a tenable conceptualist account: e.g. properties, intrinsicality, es-
sence, and grounding.  
To articulate a conceptualist account of the hyperintensionality 
of these notions one could formulate a broadly Fregean semantics of 
sentences about properties, essences, etc., in the expectation that 
those semantics would feature operators that generate hyperinten-
sional contexts. We have not worked out the details of Fregean se-
mantics of the locutions needed to express Nolan’s non-representa-
tional metaphysical phenomena, but we’re confident that such se-
mantics could be formulated for most of them at least. (And if there 
are some of which there is no plausible Fregean treatment, there is 
dialectical space for the conceptualist to deny that the phenomena 
at issue are genuinely hyperintensional: we’ve not questioned any of 
Nolan’s examples, but that’s just for argument’s sake). Of course, 
advocates of the Fregean approach incur various substantial commit-
ments, some of which are at odds with other realist theses in con-
temporary metaphysics. E.g. Fregeans sympathetic to grounding 
probably need to think of it as an explanatory relation holding be-
tween senses/thoughts. Neo-Fregeans since McDowell (1977) and 
Evans (1982) maintain (in a ‘Russellian’ spirit) that senses can have 
worldly constituents, but even if that picture is embraced, this Fre-
gean conception of grounding conflicts with the radically realist view 
that holds grounding to be a relation between worldly entitles which 
are expressly non-representational. (See e.g. Audi 2012)   
Instead of embarking on the semantic project here, we want to 
take issue with Nolan’s overarching reason for thinking it cannot 
succeed. This is the following conditional – implicit in our presen-
tation above and in his paper:  
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(N) If a subject-matter is not representational, then we cannot 
explain the fact that we need hyperintensional idioms to de-
scribe and explain it in conceptualist terms.  
 
To see that something may be wrong with (N), consider an analo-
gous conditional about intensionality:  
 
(M) If a subject-matter is not representational, then we cannot 
explain the fact that we need intensional idioms to describe 
and explain it in conceptualist terms.  
 
To examine (M) we don’t need to develop Fregean semantics for 
terms associated with the ‘hyperintensional metaphysics’ cherished 
by Nolan, for a Fregean analysis of the non-representational inten-
sional operator per excellence is well-known.   
 
(2) Necessarily, 2 + 3 = 5. 
The subject-matter of (2) is not representational, and the position 
occupied e.g. by ‘2’ in it is intensional because we can change the 
truth value of (2) by replacing ‘2’ with a term that co-refers, e.g. ‘the 
number of my ears’. (The positon is not hyperintensional because 
we cannot affect such a change by replacing ‘2’ with a necessarily co-
referring term, e.g. ‘√4’.) 
The Fregean account of the intensionality of (2) is much like that 
of the intensionality of (1). ‘Necessarily’ (like ‘Alex hopes that’) is an 
intensional operator, which is to say that (like ‘Anna-Sofia’ in (1)) 
‘2’ in (2) refers to its sense rather than its referent. And the same is 
true of any term we substitute for ‘2’: hence by replacing ‘2’ with a 
co-referring term which has a different sense, we can change (2)’s 
truth value. What (2) says is that a certain sense/thought has the 
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property of being necessary, and while this is true of the thought that 
2 + 3 = 5, it is not true of the thought that the number of my ears + 
3 = 5. 
This Fregean account of the intensionality of (2) is every bit as 
conceptualist as the account we offered in §2 of the intensionality of 
(1): it depicts intensionality as arising from features of representa-
tions (senses). Yet the subject matter of (2) is no more representa-
tional than are those of sentences about properties, essences etc. 
Thus, the Fregean account falsifies (M): the subject-matter of (2) is 
not representational, but there’s a plausible (indeed, mainstream) 
conceptualist analysis of its intensionality. We submit that this puts 
a defender of (N) on the back foot. If, as just demonstrated, there’s 
a plausible conceptualist account of an intensional locution about a 
non-representational phenomenon, and if, as shown in §2, plausible 
conceptualist accounts of intensional locutions can be extended to 
deliver plausible conceptualist accounts of hyperintensional ones, 
why should we expect these extensions to break down when the lo-
cutions are about non-representational phenomena? We suggest that 
the reason the Fregean explanation of the hyperintensionality of sen-
tences about representational phenomena such as (1) is conceptualist 
is not, as Nolan seems to suspect, because of the representational 
nature of those sentences’ subject-matters: rather it’s because of the 
representational nature describing and explaining. 
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Maurin on Grounding and 
Explanation 
Alexander Skiles & Kelly Trogdon  
In the classical and contemporary literature on grounding, explana-
tory language is routinely used to communicate what it is and to 
motivate substantive principles about how it behaves. For an exam-
ple of the first use, one might say that what explains why a confer-
ence is taking place are certain intentional attitudes and activities of 
its participants that ground it, where the sense of ‘explains’ operative 
here is in some sense constitutive rather than causal (Dasgupta 2014: 
1). For an example of the second use, one might argue that since a 
fact cannot explain itself, neither can a fact ground itself (Raven 
2013: 193). But what is the exact relationship between grounding 
and explanation?  
Two views have emerged about how to answer this question. 
Some stipulate that by ‘grounding’ they mean a distinctive form of 
determination, what we will call determinationG, where to determine 
is, roughly speaking, to produce or bring about (Audi 2012; Schaffer 
2016; and Trogdon 2013). In this case to say, for example, that the 
brittleness of the bowl is grounded by the covalent bonds of the 
bowl’s constituent atoms is to say that the bonding of the atoms 
produces or brings about the brittleness of the bowl. Others stipulate 
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that by ‘grounding’ they mean a distinctive form of explanation, 
what we will call explanationG (Dasgupta 2017; Litland 2015; and 
Rosen 2010). In this case, to say that the brittleness of the bowl is 
grounded by the ionic bonds of the atoms is to say that the bowl is 
brittle because the bonding of the atoms is ionic.  
As is customary, let us call the latter view Unionism (grounding is 
explanationG) and the former view Separatism (grounding is deter-
minationG). Compatible with Separatism is the idea that there are 
conditions under which grounding backs or underwrites explana-
tions, and Unionism is compatible with the view that there are con-
ditions under which grounding itself is backed or underwritten by 
other relations.  
In “Grounding and Explanation: It’s Complicated” (2019), 
Anna-Sofia Maurin aims to show that, despite appearances, Union-
ism and Separatism in fact undermine the use that explanatory lan-
guage has been put to in elucidating grounding, rather than under-
gird it. In what follows we will critically assess her interesting argu-
ment.      
As Maurin notes, and as we indicated before, some structure their 
theorizing about grounding in part around the following two prin-
ciples:  
 
Explanation: we have reason to think that explanation has thus-
and-so features.  
 
Inference: if we have reason to think that explanation has thus-
and-so features, we thereby have reason to believe that grounding 
has those features. 
 
Let Inheritance be the conjunction of Explanation and Inference. For 
the purposes of our discussion, let us table three issues. First, there 
161 
is the matter of which features acknowledged by Explanation can be 
legitimately fed through Inference. Presumably not all of them, ob-
viously so if one is a Separatist. Second, there is the matter of which 
cases and for what agents Inference applies. Presumably that question 
would require an appeal to broader epistemological considerations 
before it could be fully resolved.1 Third, there are alternative ap-
proaches to theorizing about grounding that do not (or do not ob-
viously) appeal to Inheritance. For instance, Audi’s (2012) point of 
departure concerns features of determination (considered as a genus, 
with determinationG a species) rather than explanation—he claims, 
for instance, that since determination is non-monotonic, so too is 
grounding, given Separatism. For another instance, Kovacs (2018) 
argues that, given either Unionism or Separatism, grounding plays 
the theoretical roles normally assigned to it only if it has the features 
that we normally assign to it. Nonetheless, Maurin is surely correct 
about Inheritance’s widespread appeal, so her case against it is of 
great interest even if some do without it.      
In brief, Maurin’s central contention is that our theorizing about 
grounding shouldn’t be guided by Inheritance—regardless of 
whether one endorses Unionism or Separatism. Her argument in a 
nutshell is this:  
 
1. Either Unionism or Separatism is true.  
2. If Unionism is true, then explanation in the relevant sense 
(explanationG) isn’t epistemically constrained.  
3. If explanation in the relevant sense isn’t epistemically con-
strained, then Explanation is implausible.  
                                                     
1 We do, however, later address related issues in considering different ways in 
which grounding and explanation might be epistemically constrained.   
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4. If Separatism is true, then, while explanation in the relevant 
sense is epistemically constrained, grounding in the relevant 
sense (determinationG) isn’t.  
5. If explanation in the relevant sense is epistemically con-
strained, while grounding in the relevant sense isn’t, Infer-
ence is implausible.   
6. Hence, Inheritance is implausible.   
The argument only explicitly undermines the second of the two uses 
that explanatory language has been put to in elucidating grounding 
that we canvassed at the start. But the first use seems to be threatened 
as well. Consider Dasgupta’s attempt to communicate what ground-
ing is, mentioned above. Presumably, implicit appeal is made to In-
heritance here as well: Explanation is appealed to when it is said that 
the relation that the conference’s taking place stands to certain facts 
about its participants is a relation of explanationG, and Inference is 
appealed to when one then infers that this is also a case of grounding. 
But if Maurin’s argument is sound, using Inheritance to glean infor-
mation about grounding’s non-structural features seems no better 
off than using Inheritance to glean information about its structural 
features.     
Let us grant (1) in Maurin’s argument. And clearly, the argument 
is logically valid. So in the remainder of this paper, we will critically 
assess Maurin’s defense of (2)–(5).  
Start with (2)—if Unionism is true, then explanation in the rele-
vant sense (explanationG) isn’t epistemically constrained. The ra-
tionale of this premise seems to be this. Suppose that Unionism is 
true. If so, then explanationG and grounding are one and the same. 
But that would seem to imply that explanationG is not epistemically 
constrained. For if explanationG were epistemically constrained, 
then grounding would be too—and that would appear to make it an 
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at least partially non-objective matter which facts are grounded by 
which, and this is ruled out by the “inflated” notion of grounding at 
issue in Maurin’s discussion. Here grounding is understood to be 
“an objective and mind-independently obtaining hyperintensional 
and non-monotonic strict partial ordering relation” (p. 1574). 
In reply, note that there are at least two ways in which grounding 
may be said to be epistemically constrained. First, say that a relation, 
R, is strongly epistemically constrained just in case whether a certain 
R-relationship holds on a particular occasion is constrained by what 
actual subjects know or don’t know, their cognitive capacities, and 
so forth on that particular occasion. Maurin seems to have this type 
of epistemic constraint in mind when, for example, she writes that 
explanation “is a function of the needs, knowledge, and expectations 
of those to whom the explanation is offered” (p. 1580). In this case, 
some facts ground another fact only if particular subjects are epis-
temically related to this collection of facts in the appropriate way.   
Second, say that relation, R, is weakly epistemically constrained 
just in case whether a certain R-relationship holds is constrained by 
general epistemic facts (roughly, epistemic facts that concern hypo-
thetical, idealized agents). For example, you might think that some 
facts ground another fact only if questions about why the latter 
should obtain given that the former obtain lack substantive content 
for any individual fully informed about the natures of the entities 
these facts involve (Trogdon 2013). Or you might think that some 
facts ground another only if there are conditions under which the 
right sorts of subjects are in a position to understand in the right way 
why it is that the grounded fact obtains given that its grounds obtain. 
Maurin seems to have something closer to this type of epistemic con-
straint in mind when she speaks of how explanation must bear on 
“the understanding of its (potential) receiver,” implying that it need 
not be an actual one (p. 1580).   
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Suppose it is granted that grounding being epistemically con-
strained in the first, stronger way is incompatible with grounding 
being objective.2 Nonetheless, grounding being epistemically con-
strained in the second, weaker way is compatible with its objectivity. 
So if grounding is weakly yet not strongly epistemically constrained, 
then it seems that the rationale for (2) is off the mark.  
Maurin might respond to our criticism of (2) by claiming that it 
is not only a necessary condition on explanation in general—and thus 
explanationG in particular—that certain epistemic constrains be met; 
it is also part of the essential nature of explanation itself that this be 
so. On some views, this would be enough for explanationG to be less-
than-fully objective (cf. Jenkins 2005). But if unionism is true, 
grounding just is explanationG; thus it would appear to follow that 
grounding would be essentially constrained by epistemic factors, and 
thus less-than-fully objective too.    
We have two replies to this type of response. The first appeals to 
the distinction between what is part of the nature of a plurality of 
things vs. what is part of the nature of any individual amongst this 
plurality. As an example, although it is plausible to think that it is 
essential to Socrates and Plato taken together that they be distinct, it 
is implausible to think that it is essential to either Socrates or Plato 
alone that they be distinct, given that it is implausible to think that 
there are any essential truths about the one that concern the other 
(cf. Fine 1994: 54).  
With this distinction in tow, one might respond as follows. It is 
not part of the nature of explanation alone that, say, the right sorts 
                                                     
2 Generally speaking, though, it is not. Let [p] be the fact that Kelly knows that 
2+2=4, and let [q] be the fact that Alex knows that 5+7=12. Now, [p] and [q] to-
gether ground [p & q]. Yet surely one can hold that this grounding relationship 
is fully objective, even if its holding requires the obtaining of certain facts about 
what particular subjects know.      
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of subjects must be in a position to understand in the right way why 
the explanandum obtains given that the explanans obtains. Rather, 
this is an essential truth about explanation and understanding taken 
together. We see no reason why one cannot make the second claim 
without making the first. But if so, that alone is no threat to expla-
nation, and thus grounding, being fully objective. After all, it is also 
an essential truth about understanding taken together with whatever 
fully objective phenomenon one chooses—say, photosynthesis—
that they are distinct. But the fact that understanding figures into an 
essential truth about understanding and photosynthesis is obviously 
no reason for believing that photosynthesis is less-than-fully objec-
tive. Similarly, we say, in the case at hand.      
Our second response instead appeals to the thought that the 
broadly Aristotelian notion of essence at issue here is itself a notion 
of explanation: what is part of the nature of something in some sense 
helps to explain what it is to be that very thing (cf. Fine 2015). Sup-
pose that thought is correct. Then even if it is conceded that expla-
nationG is essentially linked to certain epistemic factors, it does not 
follow that grounding is too, even if grounding just is explanationG. 
The reason is that explanatory language is generally agreed to be the 
sort that generates opaque contexts, since whether an explanation 
statement is true is sensitive to the way in which it represents the 
explanans and explanandum (cf. Ruben 1990: 219). Yet the view 
under consideration is precisely that the expression “… is essentially 
linked to such-and-such epistemic factors” is sensitive to the sorts of 
factors that render explanatory contexts opaque in general. Hence, 
if the “…” position in this expression is opaque, one cannot validly 
infer that grounding is essentially linked to such-and-such epistemic 
factors even if explanationG is and Unionism is true. To do so would 
be to invalidly apply Leibniz’s Law within an opaque context.      
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Let us now turn to (3)—if explanation in the relevant sense isn’t 
epistemically constrained, then Explanation is implausible. (To say 
that Explanation in this context is implausible is to say that any in-
teresting instance of Explanation, e.g. explanation is irreflexive, is 
unmotivated.) According to Maurin, explanation in the ordinary 
sense is epistemically constrained. Maurin writes, “…when we let 
the properties of explanation guide us in our characterization of 
grounding, our [judgements] arguably derive from intuitions 
formed based on our encounters with ‘normal’ explanation,” where 
normal explanation is epistemically constrained (p. 1581). So the 
thought is that when we say that we have reason to think that expla-
nation has thus-and-so features (i.e. when we say that Explanation 
is true), we’re appealing to the ordinary sense of explanation, a no-
tion that we have a good grip on. By contrast, any conception of 
explanation according to which it isn’t epistemically constrained is 
obscure. Here Maurin agrees with Thompson, who claims that 
when we strip away the epistemic features of explanation, we “lose 
our grasp” of what explanation is (2016: 397).    
In reply, it is true that, given Unionism, the objectivity of ground-
ing ensures that explanation in the relevant sense isn’t constrained 
by what particular subjects already know or don’t know, their cog-
nitive capacities, and so on. But, given our discussion above, expla-
nation in the relevant sense being tied to general epistemic facts is 
compatible with explanation being objective.  
Now, perhaps Maurin thinks that if there is nothing more to ex-
planation in the relevant sense being epistemically constrained than 
it being tied to general epistemic facts like those described above, 
then the relevant notion of explanation, unlike the ordinary notion, 
is obscure. In that case we don’t really know what features explana-
tion in the relevant sense has—Explanation is implausible.  
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We’re willing to grant for the sake of argument that the concep-
tion of explanation at issue here might not capture the ordinary no-
tion of explanation. This is compatible, however, with this concep-
tion of explanation figuring in ordinary thinking. And, even if it 
doesn’t, we don’t find the notion obscure. Compare: while what is 
conceivable is arguably epistemically constrained, a conception of 
conceivability that understands this dimension of conceivability 
solely in terms of general epistemic facts (e.g. ideal rational reflection 
not detecting contradictions) isn’t obscure (Chalmers 2002). The 
moral: once we get clear on what Unionism rules out with respect 
to the potential epistemic dimension of explanation and what it 
doesn’t, for all we have been told Explanation is in good standing.     
It’s worth noting that in considering Strevens’ (2008, ch. 3) dis-
cussion of the connection between explanation and understanding, 
Maurin briefly considers an approach to explanation that resembles 
in certain ways the view that explanation is weakly epistemically con-
strained (i.e. explanatory relationships are tied to general epistemic 
facts). Maurin goes on to claim that, given Separatism, explanation 
so understood is sufficiently different from grounding so as to un-
dermine Inference. We will critically assess this claim below. But 
note that in the present context this claim is neither here nor there, 
as we are considering Unionism and the idea that grounding is iden-
tical to a form of weakly epistemically constrained explanation.  
Let us next turn to (4)—if Separatism is true, then, while expla-
nation in the relevant sense is epistemically constrained, grounding 
in the relevant sense (determinationG) isn’t. We have already consid-
ered Maurin’s rationale for the claim that grounding isn’t epistemi-
cally constrained—it’s having this feature is incompatible with the 
“inflated” conception of grounding according to which grounding 
is objective. And moreover, Maurin notes that, while it’s possible for 
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the Separatist to say that explanation in the relevant sense isn’t epis-
temically constrained, the package of views consisting of the inflated 
notion of grounding combined with an epistemically unconstrained 
notion of explanation is a “raw deal,” and it is “…unclear why one 
would want to hold this view” (p. 1578).  
At this juncture, what was said above with regard to (2) applies to 
(4) as well. We have already seen that the inflated notion of ground-
ing is compatible with grounding being only weakly epistemically 
constrained, i.e. only by general epistemic facts. And we have also 
already seen that we can maintain that explanation is weakly epis-
temically constrained without it being strongly constrained, i.e. by 
what particular subjects know or don’t know, their cognitive capac-
ities, and so on. 
We would like, however, to focus here on a different idea. We 
think that there are viable approaches to explanation according to 
which explanation isn’t epistemically constrained, even in the sense 
of being tied to general epistemic facts. One such approach com-
bines a version of the so-called ontic view of explanation with a more 
complex view of good explanation: while epistemic matters aren’t rel-
evant to what makes something an explanation, they are relevant to 
what makes something a good explanation. More specifically, the 
view we have in mind is this: while explanations must satisfy certain 
ontic constraints—roughly, they need to represent the right stuff in 
the world—good explanations must satisfy certain ontic and epis-
temic constraints—roughly, they need to represent the right stuff in 
the world in the right way. Compatible with this proposal is the idea 
that one of these constraints is more fundamental than the other 
regarding what it takes to be good explanation—one might think, 
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for example, that the epistemic constraint is met only if the ontic 
constraint is met but not vice versa.3  
Let us finally turn to (5)—if explanation in the relevant sense is 
epistemically constrained while grounding in the relevant sense isn’t, 
Inference is implausible. (To say that Inference is implausible in this 
context is to say that the sort of inferences at issue with Inference, 
e.g. since explanation is irreflexive, so too is grounding, are unli-
censed.) What is the rationale behind this claim? Maurin writes:  
… as part of what it is to be an explanation is to be this mind-de-
pendent and epistemic thing, why think that explanation having the 
properties it does, justifies our thinking that those are the properties 
had by worldly and mind-independent grounding? No good reason 
comes to mind. (pp. 1578–9, emphasis in original).  
Maurin’s rationale seems to be that if grounding is fully objective, 
yet explanationG is not, then it is implausible to infer that grounding 
has certain features given that explanationG has certain features. 
We have two replies, the first of which is to reiterate again what 
we said before. If explanationG is merely weakly epistemically con-
strained—and no reason has been provided for believing it to be 
otherwise—then explanationG may well be fully objective. And if 
that is so, then there is no obvious reason why one cannot be justi-
fied in inferring that a fully objective relation of grounding has cer-
tain features given the fact that explanationG does.   
Our second reply is to challenge Maurin’s contention that it is 
implausible to infer that a fully objective phenomenon has certain 
                                                     
3 See Illari (2013) for a defense of the claim that good mechanistic explanations in 
particular must satisfy both ontic and epistemic constraints, as well as discussion 
of the priority issue. And see Krämer & Roski (2017) for discussion of good ex-
planation that appeal to grounding, which they understand as having an ontic 
constraint that concerns difference-making in particular.  
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features from the fact that some less-than-fully objective phenome-
non does. Suppose that Naomi is having an experience as of a cube 
(however that is spelt out: something looks like a cube in Naomi’s 
environment, Naomi is being appeared to cube-ly, etc.). The exist-
ence and nature of this experience (i.e. that Naomi is having this 
experience and what it’s like for her to have it) is, of course, at least 
a partially mind-dependent matter. Yet it seems that having this ex-
perience gives Naomi at least some reason to believe something in 
her environment is cubical. (Which is compatible with that reason 
being defeasible, and with her belief being false.) Yet whether there is 
something cubical in Naomi’s environment is presumably a fully 
mind-independent matter. Hence, assuming that a general skepti-
cism about perceptual experience can be set aside, we see no imme-
diate reason to accept Maurin’s general prohibition against making 
inductive inferences from features of less-than-fully objective phe-
nomena to features of fully objective phenomena.   
Let’s wrap up. Maurin has argued that regardless of what one 
thinks about the relationships between grounding and explanation, 
one can learn little if anything about the features of the former by 
appealing to the latter. We have replied by attempting to clarify the 
ways in which grounding and explanation are related to various 
other notions of perennial metaphysical interest, chief among them 
the notions of objectivity and essence. We tentatively side with the 
status quo on the theoretical usefulness of Inheritance.  
We expect that Maurin’s paper will play an important role in 
shaping future work in this area (we know that it will in our own 
case). The paper, like her other contributions to metaphysics, is in-
sightful, written with verve and humor, and rewarding to engage 
with.  
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